


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# ***JPRS Report***



## **Soviet Union**

***USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY***

No 12, December 1988

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# Soviet Union

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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**USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology**

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**Obstacles To Be Overcome To Increase U.S.-Soviet Trade**

*18030006a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 21 Nov 88) pp 3-11*

[Article by Aleksey Vladimirovich Kunitsyn, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The New Thinking in Soviet-American Economic Cooperation"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] The expediency of the joint elaboration of a theory of the further development of bilateral business contacts was discussed at the 11th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) in Moscow in April 1988. I would like to share some of my thoughts about the possible outlines of this theory, but first I will stress that they represent only this author's opinion.

**I**

The perestroika in the USSR and the new situation in Soviet-American political relations have improved the prerequisites for bilateral economic cooperation. In spite of the sincere desire of both sides to develop this cooperation and in spite of their active efforts in this direction, however, there has been essentially no serious progress in this area. It would probably be an oversimplification to blame this only on objective factors (primarily unfavorable conditions in the world economy) and to make the customary accusations about U.S. trade and political discrimination against our country. It would be equally counterproductive to say that the period of thaw in bilateral relations has been too short or that Soviet agencies have always taken too much time investigating major projects involving cooperation with the West, especially now that this has to be done in an atmosphere of radical changes in familiar organizational structures and methods of foreign economic activity.

There is no question that all of these factors played a role in discouraging several moves toward commercial cooperation, but the main obstacle today is still the absence of a realistic theory of the development of bilateral economic ties, based on an objective scientific analysis of the situation, and not currency difficulties, organizational flaws, the caution of our American partners, or all of these combined. This kind of theory would relieve

both sides of unjustified hopes and false points of reference in cooperation and would aid in disclosing and realizing its most productive areas and forms.

I think that the point of departure for this theory should be the renunciation of the stereotype of "objectively favorable preconditions for mutual trade," supposedly based on the similarity and mutually supplementary nature of the Soviet and American economies as the foundation for mutual interest in cooperation. In fact, there are many more differences than similarities in the structures, organizational principles, and operational mechanisms of the U.S. and USSR economic complexes, and the intensive scientific and technical progress in America in the last decade has made these differences much more pronounced on the national economic level and on the level of individual industries and enterprises.

Modern industry makes exceptionally high demands on the organization of economic affairs. In contrast to the extractive industry and directly related fields based on the highly concentrated mass production of identical products, the manufacture of machines, equipment, electronics, and other industrial goods and their sale on the world market presuppose flexible and diversified economic ties. The secret of success in this area is less a matter of mass production, although this factor has retained all of its fundamental importance, than of rapid adaptation to differentiated individual needs and to changes in market conditions, of good quality, of timely deliveries, of efficient service, etc. In view of the fact that the product assortment must be renewed regularly and that the production of each item entails interaction with dozens or hundreds of suppliers, and frequently outside the country as well as within it, an essential condition for competitive production is a high level of economic self-reliance on the part of enterprises in their work in domestic and foreign markets.

American managerial experience testifies that the decentralization of administration, the transfer of as much authority as possible to lower levels, the economic accountability of superior administrative bodies to their subordinates, the encouragement of immediate producers to take a direct interest in the final results of production by sharing the property and income of the enterprise, and the vigorous use of taxes and credit to stimulate scientific and technical progress while reducing direct economic regulation by the government are all necessary prerequisites for success in this area.

Unfortunately, the Soviet economy still does not satisfy many modern requirements. It is still distinguished by a coercive style of management, the over-regulation of economic processes, a supplier monopoly, conflicts between the plan and the market, and inadequate adaptability to competition. There is no question that these obstacles will be surmounted as the economic reform in

the USSR progresses, but today they place a heavy burden on Soviet participants in commercial cooperation with the United States by severely limiting the range and scales of interaction.

In addition to organizational imbalances, the obsolescence of many of the production capacities of domestic industry will impede the development of bilateral economic ties. According to some estimates, the average age of production equipment in the USSR is around 20 years, whereas it is only 12 in the United States. Furthermore, experts believe that equipment becomes obsolete after 8 years of service. In many cases the physical wear and tear and obsolescence of fixed assets are keeping Soviet industry from acting as an equal partner of the American side and are diminishing the potential for balanced cooperation. The problem is compounded by the inefficient use of existing equipment, the shortage of high-quality materials, the low level of technological discipline, and the weak incentives offered to immediate producers in the export sphere. All of this reduces the degree to which the Soviet and American markets can supplement one another and reduces the number of domestic goods suitable for sale in the United States. The result is a lack of balance in reciprocal trade, its development in only one direction, and a chronic deficit in the USSR's balance of trade.

In addition to these fundamental economic incongruities, in the second half of the 1980's the state of the market was extremely unfavorable for bilateral trade because of "plummeting" oil prices and the declining exchange rate of the dollar. We must remember that much of the USSR's foreign trade revenues in hard currency come from the sale of oil on the world market, and oil prices are set in dollars. The abrupt decline of these prices in 1986 dealt a severe blow to the country's solvency in itself, but this was compounded by the decline of the dollar exchange rate in relation to West European currencies and the Japanese yen in 1985. Because most Soviet imports from the West come from non-dollar markets, the dramatic devaluation of the American currency further undermined the USSR's import capabilities in virtually all trade relations with developed capitalist countries. Besides this, the declining dollar exchange rate made the prices of foreign goods, including Soviet ones, less competitive in the U.S. market. If we add the excessively high exchange rate of the Soviet currency, which encourages our economic administrators to import more goods and reduces their interest in exports, we are presented with almost the full array of unfavorable market factors. Soviet-American trade reacted quickly to these factors by reducing commodity turnover by more than half in 1985-1987.

The position of the U.S. business community is also significant. There is no question that the rapid development of bilateral political relations gave rise to a strong wave of commercial interest in the USSR. This time, however, it was weaker than in the 1970's. The negative experiences of the last decade, the loss of interest in

China, and the organizational confusion resulting from the perestroika in the foreign economic sphere in our country also had an impact, but the main reason for the American business community's reservations about cooperation with the USSR, in our opinion, is a lack of faith in the practicability of the radical changes in the Soviet economy, without which the U.S. business community sees no prospect for bilateral partnership.

It would be a waste of time to blame all of this on anti-Soviet propaganda and the "intrigues of the enemies of cooperation." Businessmen are guided primarily by real economic facts, and these indicate that there are still delays and problems in the reform of the economic mechanism in the USSR and that even if it were to progress without interruption, some projects would still be impossible because of the absence of the necessary resources. The key objective of the 12th Five-Year Plan—the stepped-up development of machine building—is being subjected to particularly close scrutiny. American experts are directing attention to contradictory sections of modernization plans and to the shortage of resources, particularly progressive types of metal products, construction capacities, products of the chemical industry, etc.

For these reasons the U.S. experts have concluded that Soviet industry will be incapable of securing the expansion of the country's export base and, consequently, of foreign currency revenues, the level of which will still depend on ineffective and irregular exports of fuel and raw materials. Because there is evidently no reason to anticipate any significant augmentation of these exports (due both to the difficulty of exploiting new deposits and to the limited demand in the world market), the solvency of the USSR is unlikely to increase, and the American business community regards this as the main obstacle to the development of economic cooperation. The most important conditions of Soviet-American trade (possibilities for mutual supplementation, market conditions, and the positions of the partners) prove that the tenacious belief in some kind of "objective prerequisites" for its development, which have supposedly always existed but have not been utilized fully simply because of political, organizational, and other such obstacles, has little in common with reality. The real situation is the direct opposite: There are organizational efforts and political desire on both sides, but fundamental economic processes are less and less likely to favor balanced cooperation, and changing market conditions frequently undermine its commercial expediency.

## II

This naturally makes us wonder whether there is any point in striving for the development of Soviet-American economic cooperation under such unfavorable circumstances, and if so, then for what purpose?

In addition to the obvious political considerations in favor of a positive response, there are also some sound economic grounds: Above all, the worldwide scientific and technical leadership of the United States and the size of the U.S. economy, accounting for over 21 percent of global income.

The national economy of the USSR is one of the few in the world which is effectively isolated from interaction with the U.S. economy—a huge and quite effectively functioning part of the world economy. This results in the non-use of a broad range of advantages of internationalization—from the simple acquisition of knowledge about the highest level of production to cooperation and competition with world industrial leaders, which is probably the most effective means of national economic development today.

The realities of the economically interconnected and interdependent world invalidate all of the questions about the expediency of broader economic cooperation with the United States, and with all other developed capitalist countries for that matter. This kind of cooperation is an objectively necessary condition for the Soviet economy's rise to the world level, and not only and even not so much as a result of borrowing (technical, organizational, and other) from the West, but primarily as a result of the possibility of and necessity for competition on a broader scale in the Western market. This is why we must not overlook the fact that the American market is the largest and most prestigious national segment of the capitalist market with particularly brutal terms of competition. It is the site of rivalry between goods from virtually all countries, and participation in this rivalry is an important prerequisite for advancement to the highest world levels. Conversely, all attempts to avoid international competition and to replace it with half-baked surrogates or administrative encouragement will effectively preclude the attainment of this vitally important objective.

The realization of the objective need for the development of Soviet-American economic cooperation on the one hand and the equally objective unfavorable conditions for this on the other raises questions about effective ways of advancing toward this goal.

First of all, we must create normal conditions (the kind that are common throughout the world) for the work of Western firms in the Soviet market, secure quicker and more responsible reactions to U.S. proposals of cooperation, pay the proper attention to the legitimate complaints of American firms about the work of Soviet partners, and eliminate their causes.

American business leaders have quite valid complaints, for example, about the shortage of economic information, which they need before they can make sound decisions and assess the degree of risk. Businessmen in the West usually obtain complete information about a potential partner from the partner and from banks,

consulting firms, and other sources. This is a natural element of business practices. In the Soviet market American firms frequently have to begin working blindly. Now that the most important military information of the two countries has become public knowledge, the excessive concealment of economic information puts Soviet representatives in an uncomfortable position, especially since American experts have been quite successful in reconstructing many of the carefully guarded economic indicators with the aid of mathematical models.

Our partners are also frightened away by the long and costly process of negotiation, the limited opportunities to communicate with Soviet officials, the limited access to Soviet enterprises, the insufficient coordination and consensus between Soviet ministries and departments, and their attempts to avoid making crucial decisions by passing them on to a higher level or to another department. The executives of American firms believe that negotiations should not take years but should be over within a few weeks, or a few months at the most. They have also said that the work on negotiated contracts is frequently complicated by the low level of manpower skills in the USSR, late deliveries of materials and equipment, their careless storage, etc. This is far from a complete list of the factors diminishing the U.S. business community's interest in working in the Soviet market. Their elimination would certainly help in the revitalization of bilateral commercial contacts.

We must remember, however, that these measures will secure only quantitative growth but will do nothing to further qualitative advances in cooperation. The latter will necessitate the radical restructuring of the USSR's foreign economic activity and a more open Soviet economy. In essence, we have no other choice, because political and economic realities dictate the intensive inclusion of the USSR's national economy in worldwide division of labor to avoid a situation in which we will be forced to take a position of secondary importance in the world economy. This is why it is absolutely wrong to regard the introduction of forms, methods, and principles of foreign economic activity which may be new and unfamiliar to us but are being actively developed abroad, as some kind of concession to our class opponents. This will require sensible decisions and the correction of earlier mistakes.

### III

In our opinion, a realistic program of foreign economic reform should proceed from a realization of the need for the **preliminary accumulation of currency reserves** as the most important condition for broader access to the world economy. The range of foreign economic ties can only be increased with economic security if our country is capable of earning additional foreign currency.

The current theory of reform presupposes that the main sources of additional currency revenues should be the comprehensive scientific and technical programs carried out independently and within the CEMA framework and designed for the achievement of advanced world production frontiers in the fields concerned and, consequently, for specific export capabilities; the encouragement of more active export operations by enterprises receiving the right to engage in transactions in the foreign market autonomously; joint enterprises geared to Western sales markets; specific types of production, scientific, and technical cooperation with firms in developed capitalist countries, securing currency transactions with a positive balance for the Soviet side; the gradual inclusion of production and sales cooperatives in export operations. The augmentation of exports through these channels is expected to be accomplished primarily with modern types of industrial products—machines, equipment, transport vehicles, cooperative-related parts and components, and consumer goods.

Modern production, however, can only function on the condition that all of the branches concerned have a sufficiently high level of development and the capability for the timely satisfaction of demands for new types of crude resources, materials, semimanufactured goods, instruments, and other items needed in production. This essential condition is known to be lacking in the national economy of the USSR. This is why any attempts to organize modern competitive production in the country unavoidably entail problems with deliveries from subcontractors, and the more ambitious the attempts are, the bigger these problems can be. In view of the fact that it is impossible to solve them completely within the CEMA framework (for the same reasons as in the USSR), imports from the West have become the only practical solution, and the limited ability of the country to make payments results in an equally modest range of competitive production. The best evidence of this is the commodity structure of Soviet exports to the West, four-fifths of which consist of fuel and raw materials, while machines and equipment account for only 3 percent.

To date the conflict between the lack of competitive domestic goods and the need for convertible currency for imports has usually been resolved in two ways—by augmenting fuel and raw material exports and by soliciting foreign credit. This has not succeeded, however, in putting our country in a leading position in world industrial production.

The main flaw in the fuel and raw material model of "cooperation" with the West consists in the subversion of domestic scientific and technical efforts and the increasing dependence on developed capitalist countries. The USSR stepped out of the safety zone long ago, and any further progression along this road would be counterproductive: The "breakthroughs" secured by imports in isolated areas of production will be obscured more

and more by overall economic retardation. Furthermore, the transformation of our country into the West's fuel and raw material vault is an extremely depressing prospect.

It is commonly believed that the problem of the foreign currency shortage could be surmounted with the aid of self-funding forms of industrial cooperation: compensatory transactions, production cooperatives, joint ventures, etc. To work on a balanced basis as far as currency is concerned, however, all of these forms must secure an adequate level of exports—i.e., they must produce goods that are competitive by world standards. This is precisely what is being complicated by the factors listed above. Until the extensive modernization of the production base of domestic industry has been completed, therefore, we cannot hope for equal participation in the new forms of cooperation with the West.

Of course, we could use credit. There are some who believe that large credits from the West, amounting to tens of billions of dollars, for the stepped-up modernization of our economy and the creation of strong export potential with the prospect of subsequent self-reliance in the improvement of production would be expedient, but there is good reason to doubt the feasibility of this kind of plan.

First of all, past experience tells us that Western credits were not always used effectively enough. This was due to subjective shortcomings and to the objective incompatibility of domestic conditions of economic management with the criteria on which the market crediting mechanism is based: the existence of a developed industrial infrastructure and a sufficiently high level of related production units or the possibility of compensating for these with imports, optimal schedules for the achievement of projected capacity, the strict observance of technological routines, etc.

Second, it is impossible to guarantee the successful sale in the West of the goods of production units established on credit and, consequently, the possibility of the automatic repayment of credits. Poland's experience when it ignored the exceptionally fierce and unpredictable competition in the world market and the probability of unfavorable market conditions, combined with its overestimation of its own production potential, should serve as a warning against foreign economic adventures. Any interruption in the repayment of credit will require larger deliveries of non-renewable natural resources—the country's only real export reserve today. Besides this, if we consider the fact that interest on the credit will increase the sum substantially by the time the loan has been repaid, the increase in fuel and raw material exports dictated by large credits could reach catastrophic proportions.

Third, broad-scale imports of Western technology on credit would unavoidably nullify our own engineering efforts in the fields concerned. Any technological

imports from the West are at least 2 or 3 years, and usually more, behind the leaders. Therefore, after receiving a single (even if a protracted one) injection of less than state-of-the-art technology, the Soviet economy would be no better off than at the start, because it would have an industrial base which would soon become obsolete and an undermined scientific research potential.

In general, we must admit that the economy of the USSR is still not ready to use large Western credits effectively. Under these conditions, we should regard plans for the solicitation of new credits with the utmost circumspection.

There is also the argument that current efforts in the agroindustrial sphere will eventually eliminate the need for untenable imports of grain and that the large amounts of currency made available in this way can be used for industrial development. This is obviously necessary and desirable, but we should not overestimate the possible contribution of this kind of foreign economic maneuver to national development: After all, it is based on the same exports of fuel and raw materials. The state of the Soviet processing industry will not allow it to compete on an equal basis with capitalist producers.

There is only one economically safe solution to the problem—the creation of domestic conditions of economic management which will stimulate foreign economic activity by domestic producers and secure a steady influx of foreign currency. In view of the current scales of the currency shortage in our country and the strength of currency stimuli, we feel it would be most expedient to take the following measures during the period required for initial currency accumulations: Economic organizations and private citizens should not be restricted in their use of currency, their currency revenues should be completely exempt from taxation, and no currency should be appropriated for the use of superior agencies. There is no question that these measures would dramatically increase the interest of state enterprises and cooperatives in exports and stimulate their efforts to obtain currency revenues.

To secure the efficacy of these measures, however, we will have to give up the practice of authorizing foreign economic operations and institute a registration procedure in which only the economic units themselves, and no one else, will determine the expediency, scales, and forms of cooperation with foreign partners. Superior agencies will simply be informed of these decisions and will not have the right to influence them. When enterprises are completely self-financing in the currency respect (with the aid of domestic credit and currency auctions among other things), income from the export of energy resources will be completely sufficient for centralized goals.

There is a real possibility that these measures will result in a net influx of foreign currency in such fields as the production and export of labor-intensive goods not

requiring any significant Western components; the performance of various types of services (production, engineering, consulting, mediating, medical, transport, and others); foreign tourism; the overseas sale of the products of intellectual activity. The work crews of leased enterprises and cooperatives, which are free of excessive government wardship and are not smothered by taxes, could probably serve as an active driving force in this work. It is significant that this means of expanding access to the world economy will not hurt the economic security of the USSR (but will actually strengthen it) because the augmentation of contacts with the West will be confined to the currency capabilities of Soviet participants in cooperation.

#### IV

The recognition of the need for a period of initial currency accumulation presupposes significant adjustments in the structure, directions, and forms of Soviet-American economic cooperation. In addition to large-scale projects, another top priority will be the democratization of export operations, the range of which could be quite broad and will depend mainly on the degree of interest and the working conditions of the parties engaged in these operations. For obvious reasons, it is highly unlikely that domestic producers will begin operating in the American market en masse either today or in the foreseeable future, and the optimal form of Soviet-American economic interaction could therefore be a fairly broad network of joint enterprises operating at their own risk in the most diverse fields.

The main prerequisite for this form of cooperation is the establishment of conditions providing maximum encouragement for the initiative and ingenuity of participants. The January 1987 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on joint enterprises on the territory of the USSR, however, stipulates unjustifiable regulations and restrictions on some important aspects of their activity. One of these is the unconditional demand that the Soviet side retain at least 51 percent of the capital of joint enterprises. In view of the fact that most of the fixed capital of any modern enterprise is embodied in the value of equipment and technology (and the foreign partner will supply these components in the majority of projects being discussed at this time), the Soviet side cannot always contribute its share only by supplying the land, buildings, and installations and will actually have to make up the difference in cash. This is why it would be expedient to reduce the Soviet share of the assets of the joint enterprise when necessary, as this is already being done in other socialist states. This matter is also relevant because of the acute shortage of available resources for capital investments not envisaged in the current five-year plan.

Foreign partners are also experiencing certain difficulties. They feel that the rate of taxation on jointly earned profits and on the portion to be transferred abroad is

unjustifiably high. The excessive regulation of such matters as pricing policy and quality control and the obsession with gigantic projects also play a negative role.

It also appears that the restraint of Western firms is due not only to the reasons listed above, but also to a lack of confidence in the prospects for cooperation in general, the fear that it will not last, and the possibility of losses in the event of changes in policy.

In connection with this, it would be expedient to record the possibility of operations by foreign firms within the territory of the USSR in the constitution and to conclude bilateral agreements with the United States and other Western countries on the guaranteed repatriation of foreign capital in the event of unfavorable changes in the political or economic situation. Joint enterprises must be granted more privileges within the territory of the USSR, and this applies not only to levying taxes, but also to minimizing all types of regulation and granting the foreign partner the powers dictated by the conditions of production, even if these are decisive powers, in such spheres as the management of the joint enterprise and the supervision of product quality control. In many cases it would be expedient to transfer the right to create joint enterprises from the sectorial level to the level of the enterprises and associations themselves.

The democratization of Soviet-American economic cooperation would put the potential of presently unutilized forms of cooperative ties to work, especially the issuance of subcontracts for the manufacture of various items, joint production, and joint operations in the markets of third countries. Considerable opportunities for this also exist in the service sphere.

It is still too early to take stock of the "gold mine" of Soviet-American commercial cooperation, but there is no question that it does exist and that it could be developed quite profitably with the proper approach.

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**Comparison of U.S., Soviet Living Standards**  
18030006b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 21 Nov 88) pp 12-22

[Article by A.S. Zaychenko: "United States-USSR: Personal Consumption (Some Comparisons)"]

[Text] The outcome of the competition between the two sociopolitical systems will depend on their ability to satisfy the physical and spiritual needs of people. What is important today, 70 years after the start of this competition, is not so much the volume of consumption (where we are understandably lagging behind) as the intensity of movement and the direction of trends. Exact information is particularly necessary in this area, especially

today, now that our country's leadership has set the fully attainable goal of surmounting the most acute social ills and problems (the shortages of housing, food, and consumer goods).

The numerous estimates of personal consumption in the USSR range from 30 to 50 percent of the U.S. level. They were derived from studies conducted abroad, mainly in the United States. They include "The Soviet Economy in the 1980's" (1983), the congressional study entitled "New Prospects of the Soviet Economy" (1976), a work edited by Harry Shaffer and entitled "Soviet Agriculture" (1977), and many others. A prominent place among them belongs to "Consumption in the USSR. An International Comparison," a study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. The authors of the work are Gertrude Schroeder, professor of economics from the University of Virginia, and Imogene Edwards.<sup>1</sup>

The work reports the results of a comparison of levels of consumption in cost and natural terms for 334 different goods and services (110 foods, 163 types of clothing and durable goods, 59 municipal and consumer services, education, and health care), which do not contradict the studies conducted by the United Nations. Schroeder and Edwards estimate that per capita consumption in the USSR as a whole was equivalent to 34.4 percent of the U.S. level at the beginning of the 1980's. Soviet consumers were closest to their American counterparts in the categories of food (54 percent) and clothing and footwear (39 percent). In the categories of durable goods and services, however, there was an extremely wide gap (the level of consumption was equivalent to less than 20 percent of the U.S. level).<sup>2</sup>

In the opinion of the author of this article, the comparisons in this book overestimate personal consumption in the USSR because they do not fully appreciate the relatively inferior quality of consumed goods and services and the much more limited assortment of goods and services in the Soviet Union or the system of distribution with its long lines and constant shortages of even the most readily available products.

American estimates of personal consumption in the USSR and the United States are usually based on comparisons of the purchasing power of national currencies and calculations of consumer expenditures in the monetary units of both countries. The results are paired comparisons of the per capita consumption of goods and services in rubles and dollars and the geometrical averages of these estimates. The theory of consumption employed in comparative analysis includes not only household purchases of goods and services but also the consumption of various goods and services offered in natural form, including those provided by the government.



The author of this article used the results of his own research as well as American data. He concentrated on the quality of goods and services. In some cases (food and clothing) the search for goods of equivalent quality did not entail any special difficulties, in others (housing and durable goods) there were considerable difficulties of a statistical and procedural nature, and in still other cases (the majority of services, transportation, etc.) the estimates were taken from American sources because of the absence of comparable pairs. Because of the lack of official data on the consumer expenditures of Soviet families, the author used a hypothetical urban family budget as his model, which will be discussed below. This procedure was also extended to the American data so that the comparisons would be valid. Whenever the estimates of the author and of foreign experts coincided, the results were quite similar. The author tried to address areas of comparison which are not reflected adequately in American works. Above all, these include comparisons of the quality of goods and services and, on this basis, calculations of the purchasing power of the average worker in the USSR and the United States in terms of the number of work hours required for the purchase of a particular commodity.

#### Personal Income

Any direct comparison of the levels of monetary income, including wages, would be largely meaningless. The purchasing power of currencies can be determined only through retail prices and the consumption of goods and services. Nevertheless, the proportions accounted for by personal consumption in the gross national product and by total wages in total product can serve quite well as the basis for international comparisons of standards of living. One of the most stable structural indicators is the proportion accounted for by the total wages of all workers in industry and other sectors of the national economy in the net product they create.

Lengthy observations of this indicator revealed its extraordinary stability in comparison with other macro-proportions. In all of the countries where statistics are kept, the proportion accounted for by total wages in the national income created in industry underwent almost no changes in 120 years, ranging from 60 to 80 percent. In the United States it was 65 percent in 1970 and 64 percent in 1985. In our country the indicator was 54.8 percent in 1908 and 58.1 percent in 1928, after which it fell to 33.4 percent in 1950 and 32.2 percent in 1960, and then rose again to 36.6 percent by 1985.<sup>3</sup> This low ratio of wages to net product is also present in other sectors of the national economy, and there is no economic or social justification for this.

The ratio of wages to net product in the USSR, one of the lowest in the world, corresponds to an average real wage which is low by world standards and which now fails to perform the basic economic functions of stimulating labor of high quality and augmenting its productivity, sustaining a high work ethic, securing the necessary

differentiation of salaries in line with the wide range of differences in professional skills, guaranteeing the correspondence of the complexity of labor to the cost of manpower, and, finally, securing at least the simple reproduction of manpower if not expanded reproduction.

When labor loses its legitimate, economically valid representation in the net product, it jeopardizes production by dragging all other production factors down to its level of quality. This is why highly productive imported equipment produces so little and the introduction of modern methods of production and labor organization has no impact in our country. Furthermore, under the conditions of effectively guaranteed jobs (rather than the right to work), any stimuli involving wages, raises, and bonuses can only discredit the entire system of financial incentives.

The economic value of a job is meaningful only when it is acknowledged by each worker and is not merely declared by government officials. Only this can rejuvenate, and not merely reanimate, the exceptionally important economic factor represented by incentives for high quality labor. All other conditions being equal, the higher the wages, the greater this incentive will be, and the more the worker will want to hold on to his job. Conversely, the lower the wages, the greater the possibility of meaningless jobs with little responsibility for the quality of labor and of a deteriorating work ethic.

Western schools of economic thought (particularly neo-classical political economy, the Keynesian school, and others) have worked out a complicated set of procedures to trace the connection between levels of wages and employment. Back in the beginning of the 1930's, people in our country were already declaring that the absence of unemployment was a socialist triumph. This "triumph" was quite easily attained under the conditions of the dramatic decline of real wages. There was never any sound economic validation, however, for this essentially social premise. In the 1920's, however, unemployment was organically included in the mechanism of socialist construction in our country.<sup>4</sup>

In the United States wages are built into the economic mechanism as the chief motive for labor. The economic behavior of people in the production sphere depends largely on the level and dynamics of wages. Besides this, they reflect the sociopolitical realities of the American society. The social nature of wages stems from the fact that in the capitalist society their level and dynamics are negotiated and recorded in collective agreements between legally free partners—labor and capital. And this is not simply some kind of formal legality concealing the authoritarian treatment of one side by the other. The freedom of the economic partners, in spite of the presence of exploitative relations, is reinforced by the political institutions of individual and organizational freedom. In other words, neither side has the right to transcend the boundaries of the market mechanism of

supply and demand, which is reflected in fluctuations in business conditions, government policy, demographic circumstances, etc. This virtually excludes the possibility of using extra-economic methods of exerting pressure on the partner. In this sense, the political infrastructure of American society gives the bourgeoisie no opportunity to appropriate a larger portion of the national product than the one prescribed by historical and social standards. This is also attested to by the exceptionally stable ratio of wages to national income for decades.

Our situation is not improved much by the addition of public consumption funds (PCF). These are government expenditures on education, medical services, social security and insurance, and other benefits the population receives in addition to wages. The United States passed us up in terms of proportional government-financed PCF in national income in the middle of the 1970's, and we were already lagging behind most of the West European countries in this area even earlier. Differences in absolute amounts of government expenditures on various elements of PCF became quite pronounced. Whereas the United States spent 178.6 billion dollars on education in 1985, the USSR spent 37.9 billion rubles (including expenditures on propaganda), and the respective figures for public health care were 174.8 billion dollars and 20 billion rubles, and those for social security and insurance were 458.3 billion dollars and 61.1 billion rubles. As a result, in 1985 the average retirement pension in the USSR amounted to 87.2 rubles a month, while in the United States a single retired individual received 479 dollars and one with a dependent wife received 814 dollars.<sup>5</sup> Besides this, in the United States a high percentage of the funds for these purposes come from the private capital sector.

### Personal Consumption

At the end of the 1920's we knew where we ranked in the world in terms of our standard of living. It was quite respectable. If we take the purchasing power of wages in spring 1928 in London as 100, the figures for other cities were 71 in Berlin, 56 in Paris, 52 in Moscow, 47 in Prague, 45 in Vienna, 43 in Rome, and 40 in Warsaw.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, we have lost many points in this area in recent decades. In 1985 the urbanites in our country consumed almost 50 percent less meat (with adjustments for quality) than in 1913 and 1927. Today a kilogram of meat (at a price of 3.7 rubles per kilogram) requires 1.5 times as many work hours as in 1913 and 1927. In 1927 the worker's family spent 43.8 percent of its budget on food (excluding alcohol), but now the figure is over 60 percent. Furthermore, in the past there were many more dependent family members.

Because data on the financial expenditures of Soviet families on personal consumption are still not being published in our country, we based our comparisons on a hypothetical urban family consisting of two working spouses with an average wage (190 rubles a month in 1985) and two minor children. American statistics are based on the same family composition and income level.<sup>7</sup>

Food: According to data for 1985, per capita meat consumption was 62 kilograms in the USSR and 120 kilograms in the United States. Furthermore, the meat sold to the population in our country is of much poorer quality than in the United States. If we eliminate these differences—i.e., if we exclude fat, suet, lard (internal fat), and by-products and if we consider the fact that poultry consumption statistics in the United States are based on completely cleaned chickens and turkeys—the meat consumption correlation in terms of weight will be 1:3. There are also great differences in the consumption of other foods (see Table 1).

Table 1. Per Capita Food Consumption in USSR and United States, Kilograms per Year\*

	1913			1927			1970			1985	
	Russia	USA		USSR	USA		USSR	USA		USSR	USA
Meat	70.4	71.8		78.0	68.1	48.0	118.0	62.0	120.0		
			(including poultry)		(excluding poultry)			(including poultry)			
Fish	—	—		11.6	6.4	15.4	6.7	18.0	6.9		
Milk	—	—		67.0	369.0	307.0	255.0	325.0	270.0		
Animal fat	—	—		4.1	—	4.9	2.4	6.6	2.3		
Vegetables	—	—		71.5	—	82.0	124.0	102.0	126.0		
Potatoes	162.2	96.5		166.7	75.4	130.0	53.0	104.0	55.0		
Sugar	7.9	37.0		21.0	47.0	39.0	46.0	42.0	31.0		

\* Figures for USSR for 1913 and 1927 apply only to urbanites.

The meat consumption figure for Russian cities in 1913 does not include poultry. Soviet estimates of meat consumption include, we repeat, fat, lard, and by-products, and this fat increases the weight of meat by a factor of 1.4, but in the United States red meat is calculated only according to carcass weight, without fat and by-products. The poultry figure includes only the meat of chickens and turkeys, excluding giblets. All of this increases the consumption gap. If meat consumption in the USSR were to be converted to correspond to American standards, it would be 40-45 kilograms, and not 62 (for 1985). Similar adjustments must be made for other products: Fish in the USSR is calculated in live weight, but in the United States it is calculated in fillets; potatoes, vegetables, and fruit are sold with a high percentage of foreign matter and produce unfit for consumption, etc.

Calculated according to data in: "Statisticheskiye materialy po voprosu o potreblenii myasa v Rossiyskoy imperii v 1913 g." [Statistical Information About Meat Consumption in the Russian Empire in 1913], Petrograd, 1915; "Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii 1913" [Statistical Almanac of Russia, 1913], St. Petersburg, 1914, pp 63, 659; "Statisticheskiy spravochnik SSSR" [Statistical Handbook of the USSR], Moscow, 1929, pp 854-857; "Byudzhety rabochikh i sluzhashchikh" [Worker and Employee Budgets], Series 1, Moscow, 1929, p 31; "Historical Statistics of the United States," pt 1, 1975, pp 329-331; "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987," pp 109-110.

American researchers Schroeder and Edwards arrive at similar conclusions. According to their calculations, levels of food consumption (with adjustments for differences in quality) in the USSR at the beginning of the 1980's were the following (with the U.S. level representing 100): meat—34.2, fats and butter—29.8, fish—67, sugar—104, bread—95.5, dairy products—63, potatoes—90, vegetables—19.3, fruit—19.7, non-alcoholic beverages—36.5, alcohol—119.<sup>8</sup>

The now traditional differences between the USSR and the United States in eating habits and in the consumption of individual foods still exist. There are particularly pronounced differences in the consumption of fats and produce. Although the caloric content of the average diet is approximately the same in the USSR and the United States (respectively, 3,300 and 3,380 calories a day per capita), bread and potatoes account for 46 percent of the Soviet consumer's daily diet and meat and fish represent 8 percent. The corresponding indicators in the United States are 22 percent and 20 percent.<sup>9</sup> Fresh perishable fruits and vegetables are virtually unavailable to most of our population except during the short harvest season.

The monthly diet per person calculated according to Soviet statistics for urbanites costs 46.4 rubles in retail prices on the average. Expenditures on food (not counting alcohol) represented 59 percent of the consumer spending of a family of four with two working members who earned 380 rubles a month (before taxes) in 1985. For the sake of comparison, the indicator for the United States, calculated according to the same procedure, was 15.2 percent in 1984. According to Soviet and foreign statistics, the percentage of consumer expenditures spent on food in some other countries and regions was 23 percent in Greece, 24.9 percent in France (for workers' families), 40 percent in Bulgaria, 45 percent in Spain, 21 percent in Western Europe as a whole, 19.9 percent in Japan, and 13.8 percent in Hong Kong.<sup>10</sup>

In the opinion of Soviet and foreign researchers, the percentage of family consumer expenditures spent on food is an accurate indicator of the material standard of living: As a rule, the lower the percentage, the higher the standard of living and, in particular, the higher the level of consumption. The actual volumes of consumption in the USSR are far below the recommendations of Soviet experts for many products (the "dietary norms"). In line with these norms, food should account for 71 percent, and not 59 percent, of the spending of the hypothetical urban family; it would take 90 percent of the average

Soviet family's budget to reach the quantitative (but not the qualitative) dietary norms of the American family. In line with American quality standards, the Soviet family's food expenditures should be equivalent to 180 percent of its budget.

Estimates of economic accessibility based on the number of work hours required to buy different foods indicated that the Soviet worker has to work much longer than the average American to buy a unit of product: In 1985 he had to work 10 to 12 times as long to buy meat, 18 to 20 times as long to buy poultry, 3 times as long to buy milk, 7 times as long to buy butter, 10 to 15 times as long to buy eggs, 18 to 25 times as long to buy oranges and bananas, 2 to 8 times as long to buy bread, and 18 times as long to buy vodka.

Differences in eating habits in our two countries changed continuously throughout the 20th century. In 1913 per capita meat consumption in the cities of the Russian Empire (excluding the meat transported along inland waterways and some imports) amounted to 88 kilograms, and the figures for specific cities were 87 for Moscow, 94.1 for St. Petersburg, 107.5 for Vladimir, 107.5 for Vologda, and 147.7 for Voronezh. Per capita meat consumption figures were even higher in cities in Siberia and the Far East. Commercial meat production was distributed more or less evenly among all parts of the country: In Russia as a whole the local resources of provinces accounted for 64 percent of the meat consumed, and the figure was 71 percent in Moscow and 50 percent in St. Petersburg. Meat was shipped to regions experiencing a meat shortage. For example, meat shipped from other provinces covered from 60 to 70 percent of the needs of cities in Siberia and the Far East. The cities with the lowest meat consumption included Warsaw—55.2 percent.<sup>11</sup> We should recall that meat consumption in Poland now is much higher than in the USSR.

The Civil War, the devastation, and the economic chaos led to a catastrophic decline in food consumption, and in some places to the severe mass hunger that took the lives of millions of people. The replacement of the food allotment system with a food tax, the expansion of cooperative forms of economic management in rural and urban areas, the stronger commodity and money relationships in the economy, and the brilliantly conducted monetary reform, however, completely solved the food problem as much as it could have been solved at that

time in just 5 years—from 1922 to 1927. The per capita consumption of most products reached and surpassed pre-revolutionary levels (see Table 1).

Indicators of the economic accessibility of goods in the late 1920's were close to pre-revolutionary figures. In 1927 the average worker in industry had to work 2 hours to buy a kilogram of meat (2.1 hours in 1913 and around 3 hours in 1985). In 1927 food accounted for 43.8 percent of the consumer spending of the families of workers and employees (mostly urbanites), but in 1960 the figure was over 60 percent.<sup>12</sup>

As for the United States, the quality of the American diet at the beginning of the 20th century differed in some respects from present dietary standards. Between 1913 and 1985, for example, per capita consumption figures increased by 22 percent for beef and 11 percent for fish and rose 4.6-fold for poultry, while the consumption figures decreased by 11 percent for milk, 19 percent for eggs, 43 percent for potatoes, and almost 50 percent for flour.<sup>13</sup> This change of diet did not increase the calorie content but did improve the chemical and biological makeup of the diet and equalized social-class dietary

differences. By 1970 the problem of improving the quality of the diet of various social groups had gradually ceased to exist. Today both wealthy and poor Americans consume their 100-120 kilograms of meat each year. The quality of this meat is another matter (cheap chicken or expensive veal steak). In the USSR, on the other hand, according to the data of USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], families of four with a monthly income of 260 rubles ate only around one-third as much meat and meat products as families of the same size with an income of 900 rubles in 1986.

The quicker growth of labor productivity in agriculture and the overall increase in the real income of the families of workers and employees in the United States in recent decades has considerably augmented the economic accessibility of foods. Between 1913 and 1985 the number of hours the average worker had to work to buy a kilogram of meat decreased by a factor of 4.4, and the corresponding figures for other foods were 11.5 for butter, 6.7 for milk, 6.2 for sugar, 5 for flour, 5 for bread, 5.7 for potatoes, and 5 for oranges.

Therefore, in the last 80 years the differences in the economic accessibility of foods in the United States and USSR have become particularly pronounced (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Relationship of Work Hours Required in USSR (Russia Until 1917) for Purchase of 1 Kilogram of Food to U.S. Level (U.S. Indicator is 1)**

Year	Meat (beef)	Milk	Butter	Bread	Sugar	Potatoes
1913	1.5	1.4	1.8	0.5	6.5	—
1927	1.9	2.1	2.7	0.7	6.1	1.6
1960	4.4	4.6	8.9	2.0	18.2	2.3
1985	10.0	4.5	10.1	2-8	10.2	3.0

Calculated according to same sources as Table 1 and "Historical Statistics of the United States," pt 1, pp 213, 166, 170, 174; SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, No 7, 1986, p 67.

Alcohol: According to official data, the consumption of pure alcohol obtained through the state trade network in 1980 was 8.7 liters per person in the USSR (7.4 liters in the United States in 1985),<sup>14</sup> and per capita vodka consumption was around 22 liters a year (1.81 liters a month per person). Per capita alcohol consumption in the USSR almost quintupled between 1913 and 1985.

The proportion of hard liquor (mainly vodka) in all alcoholic beverages is 69 percent in the USSR and 23 percent in the United States. These figures do not include home-brew. It is consumed in our country in the same quantities as vodka. In the last 30 years the USSR has ranked highest in hard liquor consumption and has been far ahead of the other 28 developed countries in the world to which it was compared.<sup>15</sup> Whereas expenditures on hard liquor range from 1 percent to 6 percent of the family budget in all countries of the world on the average, the figure in the USSR in 1985 was around 13

percent (not counting home-brew). For the sake of comparison, alcohol expenditures represent 1.5 percent of the American family budget.<sup>16</sup>

Housing: Housing plays an exceptionally important role in the standard of living. The Soviet Union is lagging behind most countries in the world in this respect. In 1985 the average living area (including area without conveniences) per person in the USSR was around 9 square meters, approximately the same figure as in St. Petersburg in 1913. In terms of living area with all of the amenities, our per capita area is only one-sixth or one-seventh of the area in the United States (4.5 square meters in the USSR and 30 square meters in the United States), and if differences in the quality of various services (telephone, hot water, air conditioning, etc.) are taken into account, we could estimate that the area in the United States is more than 10 times as great.<sup>17</sup>

The hypothetical urban family in our example spends more than 6 percent of its budget on the maintenance of an average apartment (57 square meters of actual living space), including government operational expenditures. The average American family spends 26.6 percent of its budget on housing. The average worker in the USSR has to work 18.2 hours to pay for a three-room state-owned apartment, but the average worker in the United States has to work 45 hours to pay for his own or rented dwelling. When differences in the size of the dwelling are taken into account, however, the average worker (in a city) in the USSR has to work 1.23 hours to pay for each square meter of actual living space for a month, with the state subsidizing part of the cost, but this costs the worker in the United States only 0.87 hours (and only out of his own pocket). In other words, the cost of housing in our country is 41 percent higher. According to American research findings, the housing service consumption volume in the USSR is equivalent to 14 percent of the U.S. level.<sup>18</sup>

When we speak of the housing shortage in the United States, we must say in general that housing does not present a problem because there is not enough housing for the laboring public (although this also occurs) but because there is no guaranteed housing.

In 1984 there were 93.5 million dwellings (apartments and single-family homes) in the United States, and 84.7 million of these were occupied. Approximately 65 percent of all American families lived in their own homes or in cooperative apartments, and the rest lived in rented dwellings. There is a good supply of housing in the country—around 48 square meters of actual (heated) living space per person. The average number of rooms (including the kitchen) in the standard dwelling is 5.1. Housing in the United States is distinguished by a good supply of modern conveniences: 80 percent of all dwellings have central heating, 75 percent have sewage systems, 59 percent have air conditioning, and 90 percent have telephones.<sup>19</sup>

Clothing, footwear, and textiles: The Soviet level of per capita textile consumption is equivalent to 30 percent of the American level, and the figure for footwear is 97.6 percent. At the beginning of the 1980's annual per capita footwear sales were 3.2 pairs in the Soviet Union, counting imports, and 1.9 pairs in the United States. The prices of Soviet footwear are high, but its quality is low. For this reason, the volume of footwear repair services is five times as great as in the United States. Besides this, customers are usually offered clothing and footwear of outdated styles and fashions. Fashionable imported goods of high quality are extremely expensive, and their sales volume is negligible. The consumption and quality of clothing accessories are particularly low in the USSR, especially in the case of men's haberdashery items (12 percent of the U.S. level).<sup>20</sup>

In the USSR the economic accessibility of most clothing, footwear, and household items, especially electrical appliances, expressed in the ratio of wages to retail

prices, is one-tenth, one-twentieth, or an even smaller fraction of accessibility in the United States. In this group of commodities, prices in the USSR are among the highest in the world.

Durable goods: The Soviet Union's lag in supplying the population with durable goods is particularly perceptible (14 percent of the U.S. level). The situation is slightly better in the case of furniture and carpeting (27 percent) and worst of all in the case of motor vehicles (5 percent). Although differences in consumption levels in natural terms are insignificant in the case of some durable goods (refrigerators and washing machines), the quality and style of the items are incomparable.<sup>21</sup>

The typical American family has a large supply of technically complex durable goods. Each time a fundamentally new item makes its appearance, there is a new wave of the "extensive" spread of its use. In the middle of the 1950's, for example, around 100 percent of the families in the United States had refrigerators and 86 percent had black-and-white television sets. Then color television sets, freezers, home air conditioners, automatic dishwashers, and other technically complex consumer goods appeared on the market a few years later, and a new period of family acquisition began. In 1986, 91 percent of the families already had color TV sets and families were starting to acquire such novelties as electronic telephone accessories, home computers, video games, etc.<sup>22</sup>

Transportation: The public transport services available to the average Soviet inhabitant are 2.5 times as great as those available to the average American. Nevertheless, the overall per capita volume of transport services is equivalent to only 11.8 percent of the U.S. level because of the poor quality of state transportation and the rudimentary development of private transportation.<sup>23</sup>

In the United States more than 90 percent of all expenditures falling into the "transportation" category are connected with the ownership of a motor vehicle. Furthermore, expenditures directly connected with the purchase of the vehicle represent 38 percent of all expenditures in this category. The expansion of the vehicle service network has led to a relative increase in expenditures on repair and maintenance. The high volume of private transport (1.8 vehicles per household) is the result of historical patterns of American settlement outside the city limits, the high social prestige of automobile ownership, and the underdevelopment and high cost of public transport (whereas it costs 5 kopecks to travel from one end of the city to another in the USSR, in New York, for example, it can cost up to 2 dollars, depending on the length of the ride).

Services: There is still an exceptionally wide gap between the two countries in the consumption of services. Per capita consumption in the USSR is equivalent to less than 20 percent of the U.S. level, including 21 percent

for municipal services and utilities, 20 percent for communications, and 44 percent for recreational services. In spite of the relatively low cost of consumer services in the USSR (repairs of various kinds, tailoring and alterations, laundering and dry cleaning, etc.), their accessibility and, especially, their quality are still low, and the level of consumption is equivalent to 48.2 percent of the American level. The United States has twice as many shopping centers as the USSR. Most of these are self-service supermarkets. Although the USSR has a larger population and more working women, the number of public dining establishments is 35 percent lower than in the United States, and only 25 percent of the total are open to the general public. The striking lag in communication services is partly the result of the inadequate supply of telephones in Soviet housing. At the beginning of the 1980's only one out of every seven apartments had a telephone. The number of phones installed in the USSR, counting places of business, was only one-tenth as high as in the United States.<sup>24</sup>

In the United States more than half of the family budget is used to pay for services (in comparison with 21 percent in the USSR).<sup>25</sup> This high figure is due to the high cost of these services, the constantly expanding variety of services offered, and their high quality. These include traditional consumer services (laundering, hairdressing, etc.) and relatively new ones: health services, various types of information services, service packages for vacationers and travelers, and various types of business services. The prices of paid services in the United States (just as in other countries with a market economy) are quite high, because wages represent a large share (from 70 to 100 percent) of the total overhead cost. The highly competitive conditions of the commercial production and distribution of services and the rivalry for clients reliably guard against unjustifiable price increases or the deterioration of the quality of services.

**Medical services:** One of socialism's universally acknowledged achievements is free medical care for the population, but the extremely low level of material supplies in our public health system makes timely medical assistance of high quality almost inaccessible. In the 1980's one out of every six hospital beds in the country was not supplied with water, even cold water, around 30 percent of our hospitals have no sewer systems, and our pharmacies frequently do not have the necessary medicines. On the whole, according to the USSR minister of public health, American medicine has from 7 to 10 times as much equipment per hospital bed as in our country.<sup>26</sup>

The veil concealing the alarming tendency toward deterioration in the Soviet public's state of health was slightly lifted just recently: Virtually all illness and mortality indicators in our country have been rising continuously for more than 15 years now, while indicators everywhere else in the world (including the underdeveloped countries) have been declining. The per capita consumption

of medical services in the USSR, according to the estimates of American experts, is equivalent to 33 percent of the American level.<sup>27</sup>

As for the American system of medical treatment, it is distinguished by high cost, fairly broad accessibility, and high quality. It is true that in the middle of the 1980's a day in a hospital cost around 400 dollars, the average hospital treatment cost around 3,000 dollars, and a visit to the doctor cost 50 dollars. The high cost of medical services and their private, commercial nature have given rise to a highly developed system of health insurance. At this time 85 percent of the entire U.S. population is covered by government and private, group and individual medical insurance plans which provide many Americans with high-quality services. The government and the private sector assume most of the cost of the insurance premiums, and the consumer covers around 28 percent of all costs from his own pocket. As a result, the average American family spends 4.4 percent of its budget on health care.<sup>28</sup>

**Education:** In spite of the USSR's considerable achievements in education, our country is still lagging behind the United States in the amount of money spent on education and the quality of education (77 percent of the U.S. level). At the beginning of the 1980's the population in the USSR had 9 years of education on the average, but people in the United States had over 12 years. The biggest discrepancy in the United States' favor is in higher education: In the USSR 15 percent of the young adults between the ages of 18 and 24 were studying in VUZ's, but in the United States the figure was 34 percent. The widespread evening and correspondence courses in the Soviet Union for highly skilled and skilled specialists must also be taken into account. This relatively inexpensive but also ineffective form of education covers 40 percent of the students in our VUZ's and tekhnikums.<sup>29</sup> Finally, the excessive specialization in the training of our specialists considerably reduces their ability to adapt to frequent changes in production conditions.

Therefore, the USSR is lagging behind virtually all developed countries in the world in the share of national income used for wages, personal consumption, and social benefits for the population. Furthermore, the quality of the goods consumed and the mass types of social services offered in our country cannot compare to international standards. Finally, because of the existence of the specialized distribution network, the quality of goods and services consumed by different categories of people are quite pronounced, and this inequality is constantly growing stronger.

The experience of the industrially developed countries, including the United States, proves that the maintenance of a specific balance between personal consumption and the net national product is an essential condition for the enhancement of the quality and efficiency of labor by means of financial incentives. In the USSR personal

consumption has represented only a small portion of the national income for a long time, and this, in principle, is keeping us from meeting world standards of economic development because this would require the effective use of all types of production resources, including labor.

The present level of retail prices of consumer goods and services (especially food) is one of the highest in the world, and a further rise cannot be regarded as a means of carrying out the food program or of pursuing social policy as a whole.

On the basis of these comparisons, we can say that the modernization of the branches of the consumer complex will require huge capital investments and that these will have to be diverted from other programs. The proportion accounted for by personal consumption in national income, a proportion which is now smaller than in all of the developed countries in the world, including most of the socialist countries, will have to rise to an economically and socially sound level. This should be the objective of the current reform of the economic, social, and political structures of our society.

#### Footnotes

1. "Consumption in the USSR. An International Comparison," Washington, 1981.
2. Ibid., p 5.
3. Calculated according to data in: "Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970," Washington, 1975; "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987"; "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let" [The USSR National Economy in the Last 70 Years], Moscow, 1987.
4. According to an article in PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, the projected rate of unemployment in the USSR for the end of the First Five-Year Plan—3 percent—was "technically unavoidable and necessary in national economic turnover"—PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, 1929, No 2, p 73.
5. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let," pp 435, 439; "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987," pp 85, 115, 340, 349.
6. PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, 1929, No 3, p 23.
7. The consumption of the main goods and services in both cases was taken from official statistics. Although the calculations have a hypothetical basis, the similarity of the results indicates the accuracy of these comparisons. Besides this, consumption volumes of goods and services were also compared in terms of their economic accessibility—i.e., the number of hours the average Soviet and American worker had to work to buy a unit of commodity or service.
8. "Consumption in the USSR," Table 8, p 6.
9. Ibid., pp 6, 8, fig 2.
10. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 1987, No 6; THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 October 1987.
11. "Statisticheskiye materialy po voprosu o potreblenii myasa v Rossiyskoy imperii v 1913 g."
12. "Statisticheskiy spravochnik SSSR 1928," Moscow, 1929, pp 552-553.
13. "Historical Statistics of the United States," pt 1, pp 329-331; "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987," pp 109-110.
14. "Industrial Outlook 1988," Washington, 1988, pp 42, 29.
15. "Consumption in the USSR," p vii.
16. Ibid.
17. I. Bayevskiy, "Fondy kollektivnogo potrebleniya" [Collective Consumption Funds], Moscow, 1932, p 102; "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let," p 517; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 1987, No 29.
18. "Consumption in the USSR," p 6.
19. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986," p 729.
20. "Consumption in the USSR," p 9.
21. Ibid.
22. For a more detailed discussion, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 12, p 39.
23. "Consumption in the USSR," p 20.
24. Ibid., pp 10, 11, 9.
25. Ibid., p 13, Table 4.
26. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 3 February 1988.
27. "Consumption in the USSR," p 6, Table 1.
28. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 12, pp 34, 40.
29. "Consumption in the USSR," p 11.

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## Questioning of Wisdom of Decision To Deploy SS-20's

### Editorial Introduction

52000005 Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 12, Dec 88 p 23

[Editorial introduction to series of articles: "After the INF Treaty"]

[Text] The heightened political and social activity of the Soviet people in the atmosphere of perestroika is making new demands on the analysis of the international situation and military policymaking in the country. Today, more than ever before, we need more detailed and accurate information and the more valid substantiation of foreign policy decisions. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the periodical press is taking a look at past events from the vantage point of today's realities. In particular, the wisdom of the decision to deploy the Soviet SS-20 missiles is being debated constantly. To some extent, these debates were intensified by the conclusion of the INF Treaty.

The editors asked researchers of American affairs and international news correspondents to debate this topic on the pages of the journal. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka",

"SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

### Importance of Western Perceptions

52000005 Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 12, Dec 88 pp 23-29

[Article by Georgiy Melorovich Sturua, candidate of historical sciences and sector head at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Was the Deployment of the SS-20 Missiles Necessary?"]

[Text] I think that many people in our country are asking this question. I have heard it when I have presented lectures to the public. It can be encountered in letters sent to press organs by readers who want to know more about military policy. It is being debated by specialists who had no doubts at all about the expediency of deploying the SS-20's just yesterday.

The fact that the question is being asked testifies that the changes which are taking place in our country have now entered the sphere of foreign and military policy, which was above criticism for a long time.

The conclusion of the INF Treaty aroused completely understandable feelings of confusion in some people. Various experts had put so much effort into proving the legality of the deployment of the SS-20's, but here we were renouncing these missiles, and within the framework of the "zero option," which had been called unacceptable with equal vehemence. What is more, the Soviet Union went even further by proposing an idea which

eventually made its way into the treaty: the idea of the "double zero"—i.e., the elimination of both intermediate-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. As a result, the USSR will have to eliminate more than twice as many missiles as the United States. Is this kind of agreement equitable, some are asking, and will it hurt our security? And if the treaty does satisfy the principle of equality and equivalent security, does this mean that the USSR did have genuine superiority in intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles? In this case, was the cost of developing and deploying the SS-20's justified?

It is interesting that some of those who are inclined to reply in the negative are knowledgeable and experienced people, like one well-known Soviet journalist who expressed his views quite frankly.

Let us try to decide whether the deployment of the SS-20's really was such an obvious mistake.

The most elementary interpretation of the issue is the following: There was no point in producing 650 SS-20's so that they could be destroyed later. If we follow this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, its advocates should be advising the Soviet Union to liquidate the military industry now, because our goal is total and universal disarmament. As far as we can see, however, no one is making this suggestion yet. Some people might object to my statement on the grounds that total and universal disarmament is a strategic objective and will take a long time to achieve, whereas the period between the deployment of the SS-20's and the agreement on their elimination was comparatively short. This possibility, they would say, should have been foreseen.

Before I address this argument, I would like to digress briefly. There is no question that the history of the negotiation of the INF Treaty taught us one lesson: The quick and continuous reassessment of the limits of glasnost in the military sphere can only strengthen the USSR's position in today's world. Soviet agencies sometimes supplied us with useful data on the INF issue too late, after the other side's propaganda efforts had succeeded in establishing certain stereotypes. For example, official Soviet data on the number of the USSR's intermediate-range weapons in Europe were first published in December 1981<sup>1</sup>—2 years after the NATO countries approved the decision to "up-arm." Published information was woefully incomplete and sometimes even nonexistent, although all of the "secret" data on our intermediate-range nuclear missiles could easily be found in many foreign publications.

They asserted that the work on the deployment of the SS-20 complexes began in 1976 and that the first missiles were ready for use in 1977. At that time the preparation of the SALT II treaty was an extremely slow process entailing many difficulties. It had been 5 years since the SALT I agreement had been concluded and 3 years since the Vladivostok accord had been signed, but there was still no treaty to limit strategic offensive weapons. It was



not until 2 years later, in 1979, that the SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna, and it never did go into effect. In essence, it only froze the quantitative arms limits, although it was supposed effect a slight reduction as well. There were no references whatsoever to any 50-percent reductions, not to mention "zeros," in Soviet-American talks. Besides this, it was not clear when the United States would be completely prepared to discuss the issue of intermediate-range weapons at the talks, although our side brought the question up several times. Without sounding too smug, could anyone have assumed at that time that the snail's pace of the Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament would become the spring of a cheetah in just a decade?

Here is another interpretation of the mistake: The deployment of the SS-20's provoked the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. The allies were debating the need for the missile "up-arming" of NATO long before 1979—back in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Incidentally, it was precisely at that time that the future chancellor of the FRG, H. Schmidt, one of the ideologists of "up-arming," categorically denied the strategic validity of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The position of the members of ruling circles in the United States and other NATO countries who insisted on the adoption of the missile initiative was noticeably stronger by the middle of the 1970's. The latter refused to accept the situation of strategic parity and the systematization of this situation in the SALT process. They questioned the reliability of the system of American "nuclear guarantees," presupposing the use of U.S. strategic weapons to secure the interests of West European countries, at a time of parity. People in the NATO camp declared that Washington was unlikely to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to protect the allies now that it had lost its nuclear superiority. The deployment of the American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe was regarded as a strategic advantage reinforcing the reliability of Washington's "nuclear guarantees." In other words, the deployment of the SS-20's had nothing to do with any of this. It was no one other than Z. Brzezinski, former national security adviser in the Carter administration, who wrote in 1982 that the "missile up-arming" had no connection with any military considerations.

Although the decision of the North Atlantic allies on the Pershings and cruise missiles was made in 1979, as I said before, the development of new intermediate-range missiles was pursued vigorously throughout the 1970's. The American Martin-Marietta company was awarded a contract for the development of the Pershing II missiles in 1969. In the middle of the last decade, before the SS-20's began to be deployed, annual expenditures on the Pershing II project reached as high as 30 million dollars. The United States began the vigorous development of new types of cruise missiles in 1972, clearly to stress that these weapons systems were outside the SALT framework.

I can foresee the following question in response to my description of the gradual preparations for the NATO decision on intermediate-range missiles: Is the author's assessment of NATO's position on "missile up-arming" in the 1970's not too fatalistic? Obviously, we must admit that the trump card represented by the new SS-20 intermediate-range missiles was skillfully employed by Washington and the NATO leadership, especially—and this bears repeating—because of our inexcusably lengthy silence regarding data on intermediate-range forces. Here I would like to simultaneously agree and disagree with G.A. Trofimenko's statement that NATO's reaction to the deployment of the SS-20's would have been different if the USSR had announced its plans earlier.<sup>2</sup> It is possible, of course, that this would have made it more difficult to stir up hysterical feelings about the new Soviet missiles, but NATO's assessment of our intentions could not have been anything but extremely negative. I would also like to say that even today, at a time of glasnost, we are in no hurry to announce the type of new weapons to be deployed and the deployment locations (whereas the West is announcing this in advance, just as it did in the past). Would it have been realistic to expect Moscow to suddenly share all of the details of its strategic plans with the adversary in the first half of the 1970's? This possibility is only conceivable if the announcement of this kind of information is part of a broader process, but we will discuss this later.

We can spend as much time as we want wondering "what might have been," but the factors motivating NATO's buildup of intermediate-range forces in Europe had a significance of their own and were too important to be reduced to the mere need to respond to the deployment of the SS-20's. If there had been no SS-20's, another reason would have been found. Western propagandists would have begun wailing, for example, about the hundreds of old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles or about the Soviet superiority in operational and tactical missiles and battlefield missiles, which could have hit the same targets (although not all of them) as the SS-20's if they had been moved up to forward positions. It is possible that the decision to "up-arm" might have had a slightly different appearance, but it probably would have been made in any case, in one form or another.

The wave of anti-Sovietism that swept through the United States and Western Europe following the deployment of the SS-20's is cited as proof that our decision to modernize some intermediate-range missiles was a mistake. It is an absolute waste of time to force an open door and convince everyone of what they have already known for a long time: Before any important politico-military steps are taken, they must be assessed from various vantage points, including the standpoint of public reactions to them. But I think that the operative word here is "including," and that this should not be the primary consideration. Otherwise, we take the risk of letting the other side seize the initiative in decisionmaking on matters of national security, and the other side can then

convince (or intimidate might be a better word) the international public that "the Soviets started this round of military competition" each time a new spiral of the arms race begins.

I would also like to express another opinion, even at the risk of being misunderstood. From the vantage point of the end of the decade when a final solution to the problem of intermediate-range missiles on the global scale has been found, it is easy to see that the anti-Soviet wave has receded and that all of the controversy over the intermediate-range missiles had a completely different result. World public opinion is more vehemently opposed to the growth of the nuclear threat today than ever before. Besides this, the public knows much more now than it did before about strategic and military-technical matters and is therefore better equipped for effective struggle against the arms race. This knowledge was not a gift from someone, but a product of the intense and dramatic debates of the INF issue. However paradoxical it might seem at first, this situation with regard to intermediate-range missiles did much to reinforce the anti-nuclear syndrome in the world public. It became more permanent and more difficult for rightwing conservative forces to ignore.

The asymmetrical reductions of intermediate and shorter-range missiles recorded in the treaty are another argument in favor of the opinion that the deployment of the SS-20's was a mistake. If our reductions are to be much larger, does this not mean that we really did have "nuclear superiority in Europe"? It is true that the Soviet reader with a good memory is certain to recall the publications of the first half of the 1980's which argued that the "zero option" would give NATO numerical superiority in intermediate-range forces in Europe. In other words, the situation seems contradictory, if not absolutely inexplicable. Let us try to clear up the confusion.

One of the amazing aspects of all of the events surrounding the new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, in my opinion, is the intensity of the arguments about balance. People in the West were the first to begin composing various tables of comparative strength. Later our side also proposed its own balance option. Predictably, there were fundamental differences between them. And this was not simply a matter of differences in specific figures or in categories of weapons. The approaches of the two sides differed in many respects. I think, however, that it would be worthwhile to discuss the main difference in detail.

In the West's opinion, the balance of nuclear forces in Europe was overshadowed for a long time by another issue of a higher order—the balance of U.S. and USSR strategic offensive arms. Western experts maintained, however, that the Eurostrategic balance was one of the main factors influencing strategic stability in the situation of parity in strategic offensive weapons. Any disparity in the USSR's favor would supposedly give Moscow

a chance to blackmail the West with the threat of nuclear war in the European theater of military operations. The Western strategists' line of reasoning was the following: In a situation of parity the United States would be afraid of inviting devastating attacks on its territory and would therefore not use nuclear weapons if NATO should start losing military actions involving nuclear weapons "at a lower level" in Europe. In short, all of the facets of the very concept of the "Eurostrategic balance" were meaningful only within the context of a doctrine envisaging the possibility of limited war on the European continent. And if we take a closer look, could the correlation of the nuclear weapons of opposing sides in any theater of military operations be of independent significance in light of the basic assumption that any use of our weapons (especially in Europe) would start a global nuclear war? The balance of nuclear power in a theater of military operations is an objective part of the overall nuclear balance.

Our data on the correlation of NATO and USSR intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe should have proved that approximate parity existed in this category of arms as well for several reasons. It would probably have been better to simultaneously underscore, first, the indissoluble connection between the balance of power in Europe and the overall balance of strategic offensive weapons and, second, the American official estimate, according to which the Soviet Union had 3,300 strategic offensive weapons in 1976 while the United States had 8,400. The gap was gradually reduced substantially, and this naturally created a more favorable atmosphere for the conclusion of the INF Treaty. We must say that this approach corresponds in general to the position we took in the SALT talks at the end of the 1960's. The USSR believed that the United States' "forward-based systems" should have been negotiated along with the strategic offensive weapons. Furthermore, in the second half of the 1970's both sides began to understand that the limitation of weapons systems with a shorter range than strategic ones might have been discussed during the third phase of SALT.

Of course, this view of the nuclear balance was more consistent with military-strategic realities. This approach would not raise questions about our superiority, which was supposedly secured by the deployment of the SS-20's, or the damages that might have been inflicted on our security by unequal reductions in U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

It appears that our emphasis on the balance of intermediate-range weapons stemmed from several considerations.

First of all, Washington and its West European allies had been able to seize the initiative and to focus public attention precisely on this aspect of the balance by treating it as a separate entity. The USSR had to respond by restoring the truth, but only within the bounds of the rules the West had been able to set.

Second, incidents of inertia probably exerted considerable influence. The USSR was preoccupied with American "forward-based weapons" because they posed the greatest threat to us during the period of the United States' nuclear superiority in the 1950's. This was the reason for the indisputable and completely legitimate desire to direct attention to the unavoidable disruption (quantitative and qualitative) of the nuclear balance by the appearance of the Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe. It is true that we were inclined to reinforce the analysis of the strategic situation created by American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, an analysis which was completely accurate in principle, with "worst-case" data. The situation was slightly overdramatized. For example, the flight time of the Pershings was said to be 5-6 minutes, whereas today's estimate is 8-10 minutes. The range of the same missiles was calculated as 2,500 kilometers, whereas no American publication cited a figure above 1,800 kilometers—i.e., they could not "reach" Moscow (American publications did say that the range of this type of intermediate-range missile might later be increased to several thousand kilometers). Although these figures were far from the only issue in the final analysis, I think that they played a psychological role in the nervous and tense atmosphere of the late 1970's and early 1980's and that they influenced us as well as the foreign public.

The understandable feeling of confusion aroused by the unexpected outcome of the controversy over intermediate-range missiles kept us, in my opinion, from making a correct assessment of the entire situation connected with the deployment of the SS-20's. We do not know when the final decision to deploy the SS-20's was made—in the late 1960's, in the beginning of the 1970's, or closer to the middle of that decade. In any of these cases, the decision would seem quite reasonable and natural because it would be justified by the politico-military context. In the first case—at the end of the 1960's—the results of the attempts to regulate the arms race could not have been predicted. The obvious reluctance of the United States to discuss and limit "forward-based weapons" became apparent a short time later. By the middle of the 1970's there were some disturbing developments. President G. Ford refused to use the word "detente." A consensus gradually took shape in American ruling circles: The normalization of Soviet-American relations would supposedly benefit only the USSR. At the SALT talks the United States stubbornly insisted on complete freedom to deploy various types of cruise missiles while simultaneously striving to limit the number of the Soviet Union's Backfire intermediate-range bombers. Nevertheless, the valid and mutual belief in the interest of both sides in settling their differences regarding weapons systems through negotiation remained quite strong. In 1974 the United States armed itself with the "Schlesinger doctrine," envisaging the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe. The equipping of U.S. strategic missiles with MIRV's and the rapidly rising number of nuclear warheads in the American arsenal progressed at full speed.

Some important technical considerations lying at the basis of the decision to deploy the SS-20's also warrant discussion. These weapons replaced the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 missiles which were adopted between 1959 and 1961. These were missiles of a completely different technical era. American experts admitted that the preparations to launch the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles would take longer than a day and that most of them were highly vulnerable to an enemy first strike. According to Westerners, the deployment of the SS-20's also allowed our government to save a sizable amount on the modernization of intermediate-range missiles.

The storm which seemed to erupt over the deployment of the SS-20's was actually engendered by completely different, deeper causes. In the second half of the 1970's the specific type of detente philosophy which allowed the USSR and the United States to build bridges connecting the two countries lost its appeal. The constructive interaction of the two powers would have to be sustained and reinforced by new basic concepts. This gives rise to another disturbing thought. If the deployment of the SS-20's seems justifiable within the context of the politico-military realities of the mid-1970's, then it is possible that the politico-military views of that time were invalid, because we cannot say that the situation had changed for the better before the INF Treaty was signed in 1987.

There is no question that we have made revolutionary advances in our ideas about security in the nuclear-space age. This required the commencement of the perestroika of our entire life, however, and not only of our foreign policy philosophy. Today it appears that even irrepressible optimists realize that the new thinking will entail some agonizing difficulties. In all probability, radical changes in opinions have to be the result of dramatic situations and mistakes, including quite painful ones. Of course, we also needed a long time to understand them completely. In addition, we needed the certainty that our country would never be in the same position again as it was in June 1941 or at the time of the United States' nuclear superiority.

We should recall that the Soviet Union gradually began updating its politico-military doctrine in the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. The process of the development of new doctrinal views, however, did not pick up speed until after the talks with the United States reached an impasse, and certainly after the tragic accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Only within the framework of the new political thinking, reflecting the realities of our time accurately, would it have been possible to have found a fundamentally different solution to the problems to which we responded by deploying the SS-20's, or—at the very least—to have arranged for the preliminary, carefully planned preparation of international public opinion for the appearance of these missiles.

I would like to stress that it is wrong to find mistakes by mechanically applying the present system of coordinates to the past. There is no question, however, that our experience warrants the most thorough analysis.

#### Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 29 December 1981—Ed.

2. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1988, No 8, pp 41-42. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka",

"SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

#### Need for Public Discussion

52000005 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 pp 29-32

[Article by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, candidate of philosophical sciences and IZVESTIYA political correspondent: "Other Options"]

[Text] I remember one incident.

Around the end of the 1970's I was invited to meet some foreign journalists accredited in West Berlin. We were to have a friendly lunch and then I was to answer their questions.

I do not remember whether it was that morning or the previous evening that one of the local newspapers printed some brief comments on the scheduled meeting. In essence, the article said that the whole thing would be a waste of time; there was no point in feeding Bovin if he was just going to say what his government said and what everyone already knew.

The meeting, of course, took place anyway.

"Did you read the article?" I asked my colleagues.

"Yes," they answered in several languages I did not understand.

"Then I should make an important clarification. As you well know, my government never makes mistakes. I do make mistakes, however, and quite often. Therefore, what I say is not necessarily the same as what my government says."

The room came to life....

Since that time I have used this gambit successfully several times. Unfortunately, I cannot do it now. The reason I cannot is that the thesis of the unimpeachability and infallibility of Soviet foreign policy has been officially abolished. "Bold, interesting, and controversial articles on many fundamental aspects of all areas of domestic affairs, party and state construction, economics, culture, the arts, and science have been published,

but there has been nothing of the kind in the sphere of foreign policy. Is it possible that everything was done correctly in this sphere and that there were no options other than the ones chosen?" Comrade Shevardnadze asked this rhetorical question when he addressed the aktiv of the Diplomatic Academy, the International Relations Institute, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the question was obviously not addressed only to the aktiv.

I do not know what they said to the minister in reply, but I do know that international news correspondents have not crossed this barrier of perestroyka yet. They are, however, making the attempt.

The many years of controversy over the SS-20 missiles provide a wealth of material for analytical judgments, especially from the standpoint of "other options." I once had to write a great deal on this topic. Of course, I defended the Soviet position. Sometimes, with the aid of facts, logic, and arguments, it seems to me that I was convincing. At other times, when information was inaccessible—and this was not so rare—and when there were not enough arguments, I was no more than a "press agent." What was all of this controversy?

In the second half of the 1970's we began deploying a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile in the European part of the country (and later in the Asian part). Why? The official explanation was that this was an routine modernization of nuclear systems, a planned modernization, so to speak, and that the Eurostrategic balance was to be preserved by replacing the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with new missiles; there would be no fundamental changes in the strategic situation.

It was a well-known fact, however, that NATO did not agree with this explanation of our actions. With a view to the much longer range of the SS-20's, their heightened accuracy, and their mobility, the NATO countries announced that they were dealing with a new type of nuclear threat. According to their calculations, the new missiles, in contrast to the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, could be used for "precision" (counterforce and counterthrust) strikes and could therefore be regarded as first-strike weapons. Consequently, the balance had been disrupted and NATO would have to restore it—if the USSR did not remove the new missiles—by deploying American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. This was the purpose of the "dual-track decision" in 1979.

Apparently, at this point we should have taken some time to consider the situation. In the first place, in view of the prevailing attitudes in the main NATO capitals and the state of the peace movement in Western Europe, was there a real chance of forcing NATO to reconsider its position and thereby preventing the deployment of the American missiles? In the second place, if the Americans would deploy their missiles in response to the deployment of the SS-20's, would our security be stronger than it was when neither we nor the Americans had these

missiles? Judging by our actions, the answer to the second question was indisputably affirmative. Consequently, the hesitation over the first question was no longer practical.

Unfortunately, even from the standpoint of the prevailing old political thinking of that time, our analysis turned out to be wrong. The European NATO allies proceeded to carry out the "dual-track decision." And the appearance of American missiles in Western Europe, missiles capable of delivering strikes within the territory of the USSR, effectively strengthened the United States' strategic potential and diminished our security (on the strength of the accuracy and short flight time of the Pershing II missiles and the accuracy and invulnerability of the cruise missiles).

It has been suggested that the SS-20's were only an excuse for the Americans, and that if there had been no SS-20's the Pentagon would still have deployed new missiles in Western Europe. This is apparently true, but if we could foresee this, why did we try to get ahead of the Americans? It seems that our political position would have been much stronger if the Americans had tried to get ahead of us and we had then begun deploying our missiles in response to the American challenge.

In general, it seems to me that this was clearly a case in which military-technical logic outweighed all other considerations: After a new weapon has been "invented," it has to be developed and embodied in iron, and after it has already been developed, it has to be deployed and positioned for combat. Furthermore, within the confines of this logic, it is easy to find arguments to justify the deployment of the new system, but the problem is that the combination of military-technical and political considerations and the emphasis on immediate advantages unavoidably obscures the longer-range disadvantages. This is exactly what happened.

Our approach to negotiations also seemed strange.

We were hardly justified in issuing the ultimatum that we would walk out of the talks if the Americans began deploying their missiles....

What happened then was amazing. I remember my conversations with party officials and diplomats: All of them were shrugging their shoulders in dismay and none of them believed that the door should be slammed shut. Nevertheless, we did slam it and we walked out of the talks. And then we walked back in less than half a year later and made ourselves look ridiculous. Who needed this?

Sometimes our arguments also sounded peculiar. No matter how many SS-20's we actually deployed and no matter how many times we modified our views, agreeing to remove a specific number, we protested that precisely

this number, precisely the proportions we deemed acceptable, constituted a balance of power in Europe. Everyone knows, however, that he who protests too much convinces no one.

Now I will try to summarize a few "other options":

We could have deployed new missiles only in response to the deployment of American missiles;

We could have agreed in the very beginning, back in 1981, to R. Reagan's "zero option";

We could have refrained from issuing ultimatums and from breaking off the talks;

We could have refrained from making demands and proposals that were unquestionably and understandably unacceptable to our partners.

The new Soviet leadership quickly and decisively cut the Eurostrategic knot. The treaty signed on 8 December last year revealed the dimensions of the political and diplomatic reserves we had refrained from using for such a long time.

These are my observations on the possibility of "other options" in one area of our foreign policy activity.

I am fully aware that these observations might be vulnerable to attack and that I might have overlooked some important considerations, but this is not my fault. There are too many "mysteries" and "secrets" obscuring the Soviet public's view of our actions in the world arena. It is too difficult for a journalist to obtain all of the information he needs for qualified commentary. The situation is changing, but very, very slowly.

I realize that the United States cannot lay down the law for us, but I must point out the fact that the deployment of new nuclear systems, the progress in negotiations, and all arguments and counterarguments are openly and vigorously debated there by the Congress, the academic community, and the general public. And judging by all indications, this does not undermine American security.

The actions of agencies dealing with matters of war and peace and with disarmament talks have the most direct effect on each Soviet individual and the entire Soviet public. For this reason, these actions, with the exception of a specific group of military secrets chosen in line with "world standards," should be known to the public and overseen by the public.

I am not referring only to isolated subjects or what might be called items on the current agenda. In my opinion, there is an urgent need for the extensive, thorough, and unrestricted discussion of the entire range of problems connected with our national security. Have we been hypnotized by something like a "cult of parity," which forces us to catch up with the Americans over and over

again? If the "assured" destruction of the United States and its allies would take only 10-20 percent of Soviet strategic potential, why do we need the remaining 80-90 percent? What is its purpose? If "limited nuclear war" is impossible and if a full-scale war will result in universal extinction and universal disaster, what is the purpose of civil defense programs and the continuous augmentation of the counterforce and counterthrust potential of Soviet strategic systems? What motivated us to give the structure of our troops in Europe an obviously offensive nature? What has already been done and what should be done to accomplish the transfer to the strategy of reasonable sufficiency?

This is only the most limited list of the issues lying on the surface, and democratic military policymaking will be unthinkable until these have been discussed in depth.

Only glasnost, only the democratic comparison and contrast of various opinions—on military and foreign policy—will allow us to seek and find "other options" before, and not after, we make decisions. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka",

"SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

#### Link to MBFR Stressed

52000005 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 pp 32-36

[Article by Lev Semenovich Semeyko, doctor of historical sciences and lead scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "SS-20: A Mistake, But Not as Big a Mistake as It Seems"]

[Text] Was it necessary to deploy the SS-20 missiles so that they could be demolished 10 years later? The first and seemingly most obvious answer is that it certainly was not necessary. After all, we paid for this not only with material and budgetary resources, but also with severe tension in our relations with the United States and Western Europe, especially at the end of 1983, when we walked out of the talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Now that the vigorous efforts of the new USSR leadership have led to the signing of a historic Soviet-American agreement and have done much to secure the improvement of the international atmosphere, the unprecedented enhancement of our prestige is unmistakable. But we will never recoup what we spent, even if the SS-20 launcher chassis can be used successfully in the national economy after minor modifications. Therefore, we can at least deplore, or even condemn, our leadership for the nearsighted decisions it made in the 1970's and early 1980's.

There is no question that what happened a decade ago is not the best example of Soviet foreign policy and politico-military behavior, but we must acknowledge the reasons—which we must assume were quite serious—for

the USSR's decision to deploy new missiles in Europe and Asia. We must weigh all of the "pros" and "cons" and not fall prey to quite understandable emotions or glib skepticism.

Were there reasons for the development and deployment of the SS-20's? Yes, there were, from the standpoint of military-technical thinking, which is never devoid of political aspects. It is not only that the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were obviously so technically obsolete or that they were already unreliable in the military sense: It took a long time to prepare them for launch, and under present conditions it should take minutes, and not hours, to carry out the decision to use nuclear weapons. New and better missiles were needed.

The geostrategic side of the matter, which we do not always take into account in assessments of global nuclear confrontation, was also important.

Let us ask ourselves how the consideration of this side of the matter should have affected the Soviet Union's response with a military-technical counterbalance to the "Euromissiles." It appears that there were at least two possible responses. The first was to deploy more strategic missiles and aim them at America and Western Europe—at America because traditional strategic logic suggests that if the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union is intensified, American territory should also become more vulnerable; at Western Europe because it was here that the "Euromissile" wasps' nests were to be located.

The second option was to deploy not ICBM's, but the newest SS-20's, which would not reach America but were intermediate-range missiles like the "Euromissiles" and could therefore serve as a comparable counterbalance.

The first option was discarded. Of course, there were reasons for this, even if we only know part of the logic lying at the basis of the decision. If the USSR had deployed, for instance, 572 additional ICBM's and aimed them at the United States, this would have been valid in elementary terms, in line with the philosophy of "an eye for an eye." In the first place, however, these 572 ICBM's would have been "insufficient" simply because the countermeasures against America would have to be accompanied by additional missiles aimed at the "Euromissile" bases in Western Europe. Consequently, we would have had to plan a dual response, with all of the ensuing consequences.

But this was not the main thing either. The main thing was that the deployment of additional ICBM's was completely inconsistent with the efforts to limit and reduce strategic offensive weapons. It would have been contrary to the 1972 USSR-U.S. Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Here is what the first article said: "The parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental verreact. In addition, a specific number of submarines with SLBM's

could have been deployed near the U.S. coast against American continental targets (and this is what the Soviet Union did after the "Euromissiles" began to be deployed). After the Soviet SS-20's had been deployed against the territory of Western Europe, they could quite successfully perform the new strategic functions of a counterbalance. Another advantage was that these missiles could also perform these functions against American nuclear forces in Asia without giving the United States any predictable incentive to take the countermeasure of deploying hundreds of new ICBM's (as in the first option). The most probable response would have been a new American advance in intermediate-range weapons, and not intercontinental ones.

Therefore, the SS-20 decision seemed completely valid from the geostrategic standpoint. We must assume that this factor was sufficiently significant to determine our chosen response to the "Euromissile" plans of the United States and NATO.

Some people might ask, however, why the deployment of the SS-20's had to be undertaken so early, back in the 1970's, when the United States did not begin deploying the "Euromissiles" until 1983. Would it not have been possible to develop these missiles and then postpone their deployment? This is a serious question, of course, especially if we view the matter from the standpoint of the new political thinking. From this standpoint it seems much more sensible to prevent the deployment of the American "Euromissiles" by political means, especially since we could then have deployed the strictly necessary number of SS-20's if these attempts had failed. There was another important consideration, however, that apparently had to be taken into account in the military-technical context. At that time we already knew of the plans (and not only plans, but also actions) of the United States and NATO to enhance their European nuclear potential with tactical aviation as well as the "Euromissiles." We were certain that countermeasures were necessary. Missiles were traditionally regarded as the best delivery vehicles, and this is why the SS-20's were chosen as an appropriate Soviet response. For reinforcement, a decision was then made to deploy additional operational and tactical missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

In general, this made sense from the military-technical standpoint. The question of whether we had to deploy so many SS-20's is a different matter. It was probably the number of these missiles and their multiple warheads—three on each missile—that sent the West into a panic. I suppose we should have showed more restraint. And we also should have announced the purpose and scales of the deployment in advance. This might have prevented the dramatic international events we can only regret today. In any case, a political approach would have been preferable to the military-technical one (in spite of all the respect for the latter). After all, as a result of the deployment and subsequent destruction of the intermediate-range missiles, we lost at least 8 years, during

which we could have made significant breakthroughs in all areas of nuclear disarmament. The loss of time might be the most serious loss.

There is no question that military-technical considerations are important, but their importance should not be exaggerated. Colossal means of destruction have already been accumulated in the world. In view of the fact that our nuclear potential is tremendous even without the SS-20's, without them we could still respond to the attack of an aggressor, however perfidious and powerful, with a devastating retaliatory strike. I think that a more sober assessment of the potential of our nuclear strength was also possible in the 1970's.

Even though we made all of these mistakes, however, this does not mean that the United States and its allies committed none of their own. We might ask why it was necessary to build up the nuclear potential in Europe and begin the deployment of the American "Eurostrategic" missiles for this purpose at a time when absolutely nothing was known in the West about the SS-20's. Why was it necessary to provoke a reciprocal advance in the arms race by the Soviet Union? Why was it impossible for the United States and NATO to agree to the "absolute zero" in intermediate-range and tactical weapons we proposed in 1981? Or at least to the zero in intermediate-range weapons?

We could recall the Soviet proposal of 3 May 1983, which many people might already have forgotten but which could have led to a situation in which the number of missiles and warheads in the European part of the USSR could have been much lower than it was before 1976, when the USSR had no SS-20's.<sup>2</sup> All the United States and its allies had to do was agree to have the same number of intermediate-range delivery vehicles—missiles and aircraft—as the USSR, and the same number of warheads on them. After all, this would not have hurt Western security at all, but would have benefited it in fact, and this might have marked the beginning of nuclear disarmament. In general, even when we look back over these events today, it would be rash to say that everything we proposed in the 1970's and 1980's (up to April 1985) was a series of mere propaganda moves with no adequate substantiation on the practical level. No, the main cause of the earlier deadlocks was the absence of the necessary willingness on the part of the West. In the presence of this willingness, the deployment of the "Euromissiles" and the related undesirable international consequences could have been prevented.

Of course, past events can and must be assessed in different ways from the standpoint of the present day. We could say that the USSR accepted Reagan's "zero option," but we could also say that Reagan accepted the Soviet plan to gradually carry out the idea of the "absolute zero."



It is important to give careful consideration to new assessments, which are unlikely to be unequivocal. These assessments ultimately depend on the chosen vantage point. If this is the vantage point of military-technical thinking, the deployment of the SS-20's could be justified, but probably only to a limited extent. It is clear that we overreacted in the quantitative sense, and we cannot deny this.

In many respects, this was the result of our strictly quantitative approach to assessments of the global and regional nuclear balance, the result of a preoccupation with the numbers of deployed missile launchers and warheads, when we believed that our nuclear strength had to be absolutely equal to the combined strength of the United States, England, and France or even a greater number of nuclear states.

If we choose the vantage point of the new political thinking, however, the deployment was not justified. This, however, calls for clarification: It would not have been justified if the United States had begun developing the "Euromissiles" but had not built or deployed them. In this case, there would have been a zero situation—zero against zero. But what if the United States had then deployed hundreds or even just dozens of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe (on some other pretext)? After all, General B. Rogers, supreme allied commander of NATO armed forces in Europe, said in 1983 that "most people believe that we began modernizing our weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would have modernized them even if there had been no SS-20's." What if the United States had simply blackmailed us with the possibility of this deployment and we had nothing in reserve for a response, no SS-20's? What would the situation be today? It would be worse. The United States and NATO would have a quantitative and, what is most important, qualitative advantage in the nuclear balance. And would Reagan have agreed to the unilateral elimination of the "Euromissiles"? I think the answer is obvious.

Therefore, the situation is not that simple. Obviously, we cannot say unequivocally that we made a mistake. Yes, there was a mistake, but in the first place, it was not as big a mistake as it seems to many people today and, in the second place, it is quite understandable in view of the threat we faced.

I will briefly analyze the extent of the threat we averted by effecting the elimination of the 572 American "Euromissiles" and the 72 West German Pershing IA missiles with American warheads which had been deployed or were to be deployed soon. This threat can be measured not only by the number of vehicles and warheads, but also by their combined yield. If we consider that the 108 Pershing II's have warheads with a yield of up to 100 kilotons,<sup>3</sup> the cruise missiles have a yield of up to 200 kilotons,<sup>4</sup> most of the warheads for the Pershing IA's have a yield of up to 400 kilotons, and the rest have a yield of 60 kilotons, their combined yield would be

equivalent to around 10,000 of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the SS-20's had not been deployed but the "Euromissiles" had been brought to Europe, it is possible that the scales of this threat might have been smaller, but this is only a possibility. It is just as probable that they would have been the same. In any case, this was a significant contribution to the destabilization of the European politico-military situation (we should recall that 689 American intermediate-range missiles will be eliminated by the INF Treaty).

The conclusion we can draw from this is self-evident: The political approach to military confrontation is preferable to the military-technical approach. Political measures, and they must be timely, can and should be employed to prevent advances in the arms race and to simultaneously lower the level of military confrontation to the point at which both sides feel genuinely safe. The optimal situation would be one of mutual, and not unilateral, reliance on political measures.

What happened to the intermediate-range missiles of the USSR and the United States—i.e., their deployment and subsequent elimination—reaffirms the validity of this approach. We must refrain from overestimating the significance of weapon quantities. The USSR is now putting the emphasis on the qualitative characteristics of defensive strength. This is how the matter was stated in the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference. The quality of weapons, of military science, and of the composition of armed forces is the primary requirement for the guaranteed security of the USSR and its allies in strict accordance with our defensive doctrine.

#### Footnotes

1. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1972, No 8, p 118.
2. "Kanun dekabrya: Yevropa pered vyborom" [December Eve: Europe Faces a Choice], Moscow, 1983, p 13.
3. "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [The Source of the Threat to Peace], 4th edition, Moscow, 1987, p 53.
4. "Razoruzheniye i bezopasnost" [Disarmament and Security], Moscow, 1987, p 47. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka",

"SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

#### Military Decisions in Political Context

52000005 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 pp 37-41

[Article by Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov, candidate of historical sciences and department head at the Europe Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "A Few More Observations"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] Was the decision to deploy the SS-20 missiles justified? We will start by taking a look at the military-technical arguments. The argument that these missiles



were supposed to serve as a "counterbalance" to future American intermediate-range missiles seems absolutely unconvincing to me. The SS-20's made their appearance in Europe 8 or 9 years before the American Pershings. In line with this logic, we should already be taking counter-measures against the antimissile systems the United States is developing (which may or may not ever be deployed). We should also be working on dozens of other programs to "counterbalance" U.S. and NATO plans.

This argument is also invalid because it assumes that there are separate balances for different types of weapons, that intermediate-range missiles must be balanced with intermediate-range missiles, shorter-range missiles with shorter-range missiles, tanks with tanks, and so forth. In reality (and L.S. Semeyko, one of our most authoritative experts on this matter, knows this, judging by his works), the balance is a complex equation in which there are virtually no equal elements; in the final analysis, the combined combat capabilities of the sides are equivalent. This means that advantages in the theater of military operations can compensate to some extent for weaknesses on the central level, and vice versa. Shorter-range missiles are balanced by longer-range aircraft, etc. Furthermore, the balance in general apparently does not presuppose equal military potential or even combat capabilities, but represents the total group of forces and weapons sufficient for the deterrence of aggression or threats of aggression by specific leaders of a specific country or group of countries. The size and composition of the forces needed to balance threats depend largely on the policies of ruling circles in these countries and the domestic situation in them. For instance, qualitatively different forces and cardinaly differing policies are needed to balance potential threats by equivalent military machines if they belong to a fascist totalitarian state or a bourgeois democracy.

But now I will return to the military-technical grounds for the decision to deploy the SS-20 missiles.

At that time the situation was such that the threat to the Soviet Union was temporarily intensified. The United States had begun to equip its ICBM's and SLBM's with MIRV's and had made dramatic advances by the middle of the 1970's in the total number of strategic weapons while perceptibly enhancing the accuracy of its systems. In this way, it had accumulated definite military advantages. The USSR did not begin its deployment of MIRV's until the second half of the 1970's. Finally, one of the distinctive features of the military-strategic situation of that time was the serious advantage NATO had retained (at least this is what they thought in the West) in the combat capabilities of theater nuclear forces. The new American MIRV's, many of which were aimed, in accordance with the "Schlesinger doctrine," at military installations in the Warsaw Pact countries, reinforced this advantage. We did not acknowledge this advantage and we openly referred to the situation in Europe as a state of equilibrium or parity.

In the eyes of the West, however, the SS-20 missiles, along with the deployment of MIRV's on Soviet strategic missiles, the modernization of air defense systems, and the development of new bombers and other nuclear arms, including shorter-range weapons, were a means of **eliminating NATO's remaining advantage**. Without any open discussion of this matter, we were under attack by our critics. This occurred largely because of the absence of glasnost and debate in the sphere of military policy.

Many Western experts admitted that the USSR had deprived NATO of its advantage by deploying the SS-20's but had not achieved superiority in this way. When R. Garthoff, one of the most prominent American experts on Soviet-American relations, investigated the process by which the decisions were made to deploy the American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, he wrote that "if the military and political leaders of the United States and NATO had been in the same position as the USSR, they would have understood the need for this modernization program and would have made the same choices. It is most likely that the United States would have regarded this as a move depriving the **other** (emphasis in the original—S.K.) side of its advantage in theater nuclear systems and deterring the other side's first use of nuclear weapons."

Therefore, from the purely military-technical standpoint, the decision to deploy the SS-20's seems valid.

We might ask whether NATO's advantage was enough, whether it posed enough of a threat (with a view to the relatively favorable political situation in the first half and middle of the 1970's), to require compensation in the form of all possible means, or whether it would have been possible to economize on some elements. Was the level of arms at that time not such that it made any advantages, even relatively sizable ones, negligible? I would not take it upon myself to answer these questions in the affirmative and I therefore feel that the decision to deploy the Soviet intermediate-range missiles was the correct decision.

It seems to me that the decision was correct, but its probable military and, what is most important, political consequences were not evaluated from every aspect.

And these consequences were substantial.

In the first place, by eliminating the remaining advantages of the United States and NATO, we completely undermined the already weak credibility of the theory of the first use of nuclear weapons if NATO should start losing a non-nuclear war in Europe—the theory lying at the basis of the bloc's strategy of "flexible response." A gap was revealed in the familiar system of West European security. In the second place, the elimination of NATO's advantage in nuclear forces meant a change in the balance of power in Europe, and this naturally worried the West European capitals. In the third place, the elimination of this advantage obviously also signified

the reduction of the threat to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries from the west. By neutralizing the threat of the rational use of nuclear weapons to some extent, the USSR seriously weakened NATO's offensive potential, because these weapons were a key element of this potential. In the fourth place, the de facto balance of the combat capabilities of nuclear forces meant that we no longer had to compensate for our underdevelopment in the nuclear sphere with conventional forces, as we did in the 1950's and 1960's. Nuclear parity made imbalances and asymmetry in conventional arms more distinct and more disturbing.

Could the "missile decision" have been stopped at an early stage—i.e., back in the 1970's? Apparently, yes. This would have necessitated consideration for the worries of Western Europe, which created a nutritive medium for the relatively small segment of U.S. politico-military circles with an interest in promoting new intermediate-range weapons.

They needed an appeal for the deployment of American missiles "in response" to the deployment of the SS-20's, and it seemed to be voiced in the famous October (1977) speech Chancellor H. Schmidt of the FRG presented in London in the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It appears that no one in our country analyzed this speech in depth. Otherwise, someone would certainly have pointed out the fact that his statements were obviously distorted in the Western press. Schmidt did not say a word about the need to deploy American intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS-20's. He did, however, say the following: "The SALT treaty will neutralize strategic nuclear potential (of the USSR and the United States—S.K.). As far as the situation in Europe is concerned, this will heighten the significance of differences between the East and West in tactical nuclear and conventional arms.... The more we stabilize the strategic nuclear parity between East and West..., the more urgent the need for a balance in conventional arms.... It is important to recognize the connection between the strategic arms limitation process and the Vienna talks (on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe—S.K.) and draw practical conclusions from this."<sup>1</sup>

I have no intention of whitewashing Schmidt. He is partly responsible for the "missile decision," which he has supported to some degree since 1978. But if we had paid attention to his appeal regarding the Vienna talks, we could have benefited greatly from this. If we had stopped tagging along behind our Western partners, who had not displayed any special interest in the success of the Vienna talks, and if we had chosen to take decisive measures in the sphere of openness and in the sphere of unilateral reductions, we could have made the political situation much more inconvenient for those who advocated the deployment of the new American missiles. We did choose to make reductions (the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 tanks and 20,000 soldiers was announced in October 1979), but they were too small and too late. The

reductions we could have afforded to make would probably have saved us billions of rubles in the last decade. Furthermore, we would have cut the Vienna knot and could have insisted on further reductions, retained the initiative, dismantled the arguments of the advocates of the "missile decision," and deprived them of their backing.

It is also difficult to assess many aspects of the talks on the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe without regrets. In the first place, we initially refused to take part in these talks because we felt that we had been "offended" by NATO, and I am certain that this delay and others only benefited the forces in the bloc thriving on procrastination.

Then we gave NATO a perfect opportunity to undermine the trust in our position by not underscoring the significant argument that we were simply trying to catch up. Parity, we declared, had existed in 1978 and in 1982, in spite of the increased number of warheads on our intermediate-range missiles (which also became more viable and invulnerable as our modernization efforts progressed). This could not fail to create the impression that military policy was one thing and negotiations were another. Besides this, we always made our proposals too late. If our proposal on the reduction of the number of missiles to 140-160 had been made not in the middle of 1983, but a year or a year and a half earlier, the deployment of the American Pershings and the subsequent crisis would almost certainly have been averted.

The opposition to the missiles was so strong that there were serious doubts about the feasibility of deployment in the U.S. leadership even in 1983, and steps to meet the USSR halfway were suggested.

It was also wrong to let the struggle over a few hundred missiles—a significant threat but a nevertheless almost negligible one in view of the tens of thousands of existing warheads—overshadow the entire range of East-West relations. Inter-European relations were militarized through the regrettably successful efforts of the West. While we were arguing about a few dozen missiles and warheads, we sometimes seemed to forget that they were not the real issue here. These were arguments over the best European policy and security system: Should the old structure of the divided continent be restored now that its military basis had been undermined by nuclear parity, or should Europe have a new system of security, which is now beginning to take shape in the concept of a common demilitarized "European home"? The prerequisites for the construction of this kind of system existed 8 or 9 years ago, but we missed this opportunity.

After all, the people in the West who supported the deployment of the missiles did this primarily because of political considerations, and not military arguments. The American intermediate-range missiles were supposed to create the semblance of stronger "nuclear guarantees," sustain the seriously eroded trust in them,

and inhibit the search for ways of strengthening West European security by means other than reliance on the United States. The supporters of the missiles expected them to stop Bonn's drift toward increasingly pronounced detente, a drift which disturbed Washington and many West European capitals.

These main considerations and some other political objectives were carefully concealed, but they could have been detected by anyone who looked for them. Sometimes, in fact, they were discussed quite frankly. Here is how W. Hyland, the prominent American politician and political scientist who is now the chief editor of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, described this struggle: "The present conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union did not break out over the number of American missiles to be deployed in Europe. Even the Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe are not the main cause. This is just the territory of the skirmish. The main issue is the future of Europe: Will Western Europe continue paying for its security with dependence on the United States or will it gradually occupy a more independent and autonomous position?" Washington, Hyland admitted, had an extremely hostile reaction to "the natural tendency of the old great powers (in Western Europe—S.K.) to regain some freedom of action and escape the tutelage of the United States."<sup>2</sup>

Feelings of regret should not obscure the indisputably positive aspects of the struggle over the Euromissiles. This struggle and the efforts of increasingly skillful and mature Soviet diplomacy and propaganda resulted in the democratization of security policy. The number of people interested and well-versed in politico-military issues has increased. Decisions on these matters can no longer be made in secret by a limited group of exclusive and isolated agencies. Anti-nuclear and anti-militarist feelings are deeply rooted.

In the NATO countries there was a breach in the almost 30-year-old consensus of the main political forces in support of the principal elements of bloc strategy. Now many left-of-center and even centrist parties support the elimination of nuclear weapons, object to the offensive elements of bloc strategy, and categorically oppose any modernization of nuclear weapons. The prestige of the United States has declined dramatically. The ally and patron is seen by the public as a potential adversary.

Therefore, the decision the Bundestag made in November 1983 on the deployment of the missiles was not only a defeat for us. It was a defeat for both sides, and the West suffered much greater losses. "In terms of points," in spite of all our errors, we won the battle. (The reader will have to forgive me for making these calculations in line with the old thinking. At that time most of us thought in those terms.) Later, however, we made a move which is difficult to justify today: Our side walked out of the talks, lost the initiative, and gave the advocates of missile deployment a chance to blame everything on the USSR.

The word "if" is meaningless in history, but if we do not analyze all of the different options that were possible in the past, we will not learn the necessary lessons. I think that if we had proposed the reduction of our intermediate-range missiles to 120-160 in 1981 or even in the beginning of 1982, the American intermediate-range missiles would not have been deployed. If we had not walked out of the talks, our relations would not have been aggravated so severely. If we had agreed to the "zero option" in 1983-1984, we would have chosen the lesser of two evils and could have avoided many difficulties.

I am criticizing some of our actions in connection with the INF issue quite harshly, but I am also criticizing myself. Along with many of my colleagues, I made mistakes, gliding along the surface of issues, proving—not always sincerely—the unprovable, and asking no questions.

I think it would be wrong and unfair to look for guilty parties today. These mistakes, which were made by virtually all of us, taught all of us something, even if the price of the lessons was high. We should look for guilty parties if we do not pay attention to these lessons. I will list some of them.

1. We need precise plans for the coordination of arms buildup and reduction programs and political measures to safeguard the security of our nation and its closest allies.
2. It will be extremely important to have constant multilateral, including public, discussions of the level of the military threat. This will aid in the avoidance of its underestimation and of the overestimation that has occurred so frequently in recent years (particularly in connection with intermediate-range missiles).
3. During disarmament talks, it is dangerous to forget that the exchange of systems for systems is an external, although extremely important, side of the matter, whereas their real purpose is a change in the world political situation and in relations between states and within them.

For this reason, when we begin and conduct talks, we must be completely aware of their political aims and purpose and constantly adjust them.

4. The West, especially in recent years, has represented the conservative side in talks, striving to preserve the status quo because forces with no interest in arms reduction occupy a strong position there. This is why we must decide at the very start of the talks what we can afford to give up and how far we can go in our concessions in light of the level of the military-technical and political threat, the balance of future threats and possibilities and, what is most important, political objectives. Then we must move toward our goal as quickly as possible, without arguing about trivial matters. The

experience of the many talks of the 1970's and 1980's would seem to have shown us how easily we can lose millions while we argue about kopecks.

#### Footnotes

1. SURVIVAL, 1978, No 20, pp 3-4.
  2. "Nuclear Weapons in Europe," edited by A. Pierre, New York, 1984, pp 15, 23. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka",
- "SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1988.

#### Real Military Results of Reagan Buildup Seen Small

18030006c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 21 Nov 88) pp 42-47

[Article by M.I. Gerashev: "Some Results of Reagan Administration's Military Program"]

[Text] The Reagan administration is finishing up its term in office with a heavy load of serious economic problems that have had a direct effect on its military program and, consequently, on Washington's entire politico-military policy line.

Congress, most of the members of which were able to see how serious the economic situation was before the White House did, has been freezing the growth of defense allocations since fiscal year 1986, which has meant a real decrease in the Defense Department budget for 3 years in a row after adjustments for inflation. Even before, however, the reduction of administration defense budget requests was practiced each year since FY 1982. In the 1980's Congress displayed some generosity only twice (in FY 1980 and 1981), when the legislators increased the Carter administration's draft defense budget substantially. The Reagan administration was unable to gain the complete satisfaction of its budget requests from the Capitol even once (see Table 1) [table not reproduced]. As a result, in the last year of Reagan's first 5-year program (FY 1986), the U.S. defense budget was only 3 billion dollars over the projected figure in the last draft budget submitted by the Carter administration. In all, the amount the Pentagon actually received was around 100 billion dollars below administration requests in FY 1982-1986, and the announced 5-year program was cut even more severely—by 177.3 billion dollars<sup>1</sup>—because the White House had to moderate its own appetite to some extent.

This congressional budget policy was an accurate reflection of changes in the public mood. At the beginning of the 1980's, according to public opinion polls, more than 50 percent of the Americans supported defense budget growth, and it was at this time that the legislators increased the administration's budget requests. Later

these indicators began to decline. Defense budget growth was supported by 21 percent of all respondents in 1983 and by only 11 percent in 1985. Congress' position changed accordingly.

These budget data certainly do not mean that the Pentagon was on a starvation diet in the first half of the 1980's. Even with the slight cuts, defense budget growth was substantial and represented a real increase of 8 percent a year on the average in FY 1982-1985. The proportional amount of military expenditures in the GNP rose from 5 percent in 1980 to 6.2 percent in FY 1985, and their share of the federal budget rose from 22.5 to 25.9 percent. The redistribution of funds for military purposes at the expense of civilian items is confirmed by data on federal government purchases of goods and services, in which the amount used for military purposes rose by 7 percent between 1980 and 1985. In all, the total increase in military allocations from 1980 to 1987 was around 570 billion dollars.

In spite of these impressive indicators, however, there is reason to believe that the politico-military ambitions of the Reagan administration and the plans it announced at the beginning of the 1980's for the buildup of military strength were far removed from actual capabilities.

Judging by the majority of objective indicators of the growth of military strength, the period of the Reagan presidency resembles a continuation of the tendencies of the 1970's rather than a radical reversal of these tendencies. In the 1980's the number of regular army divisions increased from 16 to 18 and the number of Air Force tactical aviation wings increased from 22 to 26. The Navy came close to its goal of 600 combat vessels and 14 carrier task forces. The Reagan administration was able to solve the problem of the personnel shortage in the armed services and to raise the educational level of personnel perceptibly.

When we look at these indicators, however, we must also take some other circumstances into consideration. The two light infantry divisions added in Reagan's time were formed without increasing the total number of armed forces personnel. The administration cannot be given credit for the increase in the number of tactical aircraft and naval ships because the bases for this were laid in the plans and decisions of earlier leaders. As for the advertised successes in solving the personnel problem, the significant increase in military salaries (55 percent on the average in comparison with 1980) played the decisive role here.

The total number of basic units of military equipment the administration purchased in FY 1982-1985 (during the period of rapid defense budget growth) surpassed 1978-1981 indicators by 26 percent, but this growth did not extend to all types of equipment. Although the Reagan administration criticized its predecessors for the "dangerously low" rate of acquisition of new combat planes for the Air Force and promised in its first 5-year

program to increase these purchases by 15 percent, in the 1980's they were actually 22 percent below the figures of Carter's time. The Reagan administration was also unable to reach its projected momentum in the purchase of M-1 tanks, Bradley combat vehicles, AH-64 fire support helicopters, and other state-of-the-art weaponry. In all, although the Reagan administration spent much more money in 1982-1985, it acquired 54 percent less units of basic military equipment than were acquired in 1974-1977, when the White House was occupied by the Ford and Carter administrations it had criticized.

In the 1980's the rising cost of arms far surpassed the increase in purchase appropriations. The amount allocated for military planes was 75.4 percent greater than the funds allocated in President Carter's time, but the number of purchased planes increased by only 8.8 percent. The disparity was even greater in purchases of all types of missiles: An increase of 91.2 percent in appropriations secure an increase of only 6.4 percent in purchases. The increase in allocations for tank and helicopter purchases in the 1980's exceeded 150 percent, but the pool was augmented by 30 percent and 40 percent respectively.

Commenting on these facts, administration spokesmen usually cite the increasing technical complexity of modern arms as the main factor raising their cost. Although there is definitely some basis for this argument, it cannot completely explain the increasing cost of military equipment in Reagan's time, which extended even to systems that began to be purchased back in the 1970's. Above all, these include the F-15 and F-16 planes, the cost of which increased by 58 percent and 16 percent respectively in comparison with the end of the 1970's, submarines of the "Ohio" and "Los Angeles" classes, which became 24 percent and 10 percent more expensive, and several other arms. As a result, it appears that the lion's share of funds allocated to the Pentagon for the modernization of military equipment covered the rise in its cost.

These tendencies were revealed most clearly in the development of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although appropriations for strategic forces became the fastest growing item in the defense budget and accounted for more than 25 percent of the entire increase in defense appropriations in the 1980's, the number of strategic missile carriers decreased during this period (see Table 2) [not reproduced].

Of course, it would be wrong to deduce from these quantitative indicators that U.S. strategic forces have been weakened. Only obsolete systems were removed from service, and these were replaced by new, more reliable and more effective ones. Besides this, in spite of the decrease in the number of carriers, the number of nuclear weapons increased in the 1980's. The number of warheads rose 41 percent between 1980 and 1986 (from 9,200 to 13,000). Another result of Reagan's strategic

program was the considerable enhancement of the nuclear triad's potential to destroy hardened targets—i.e., its counterforce potential.

The foundations for this tendency in the development of strategic nuclear forces, however, were laid long before the current administration arrived in the White House. Three of the five basic elements in the modernization of the U.S. strategic triad—the MX, the Trident, and the Stealth—were planned in the 1970's. Therefore, the Reagan administration's actual contribution to the modernization of strategic offensive arms was essentially confined to an increase in financial support with a simultaneous slight reduction of its scales.<sup>2</sup> The administration was in an advantageous position, however, because most of the strategic programs either entered the stage of production and deployment or reached this important point during its term in office.

Another tendency also warrants special consideration. The growth of the U.S. defense budget in the 1980's was accompanied by some restructuring. Defense allocation distribution policy assigned priority to "investment" items in the budget (R & D and arms purchases). In FY 1980-1987 there was a real increase of 82 percent in these allocations, whereas the increase was only 25 percent for "support" items (payments to personnel, the maintenance and operation of physical property, etc.).

It is unlikely that the administration was consciously striving for this kind of restructuring. The changes in defense budget proportions seemed to be an unavoidable result of its political aims, especially its emphasis on the most noticeable indicators of military strength, such as the purchases of new and increasingly complex military equipment. This policy line (within the existing budget framework) could not fail to result in the internal reordering of budget priorities. In any case, proportional "support" expenditures fell to the lowest level since 1960—55 percent of the budget, whereas in the 1960's and 1970's these items had absorbed 68 percent of all defense appropriations on the average.

The structural changes within the American defense budget have a number of important implications.

First of all, the higher percentage of "investment" items, in which allocated funds are spent over the next few fiscal years instead of immediately, means that the administration and Congress have less control over an increasingly large portion of the budget at a time of rapid growth in defense appropriations. By FY 1987 the share of the budget used for earlier commitments reached 40 percent<sup>3</sup> and could not be changed without substantial financial losses in the form of payments of fines and forfeits to Defense Department contractors. When budget growth is reduced, the possibility of maneuvering resources to economize or to change priorities in military

construction is severely limited for at least a few years. Consequently, the next administration will be the hostage, so to speak, of decisions made in the middle of the 1980's.

Second, the emphasis on purchases of modern, technically complex weapons systems with a simultaneous decrease in allocations for their operation and maintenance naturally led to definite disparities in the American Armed Forces with a direct effect on their combat readiness.

Another factor leading to the assignment of priority to "investment" budget items was the clear emphasis on purchases in the policies of different branches of the armed services as a result of the decentralization of the decisionmaking process in the Pentagon under the Reagan administration. The chief aim was not the establishment and maintenance of a balanced structure of forces, but the quickest possible saturation of all these branches with the latest military equipment.<sup>4</sup> After inflating the lists of weapons systems to be developed, Defense Department leaders frequently had to slow down the purchasing process. In March 1987 the Congressional Budget Office learned that only 4 of the 40 major defense programs it had investigated had reached the optimal level of production from the economic standpoint. This tactic, which led to a temporary savings in funds for arms purchase programs, raised the cost over the long range.

In general, the practices developed in the first half of the 1980's in the distribution and expenditure of allocations for armed forces modernization programs could have produced results only in the presence of protracted and substantial defense budget growth. As soon as this growth stopped, all of the flaws of this approach were reflected in imbalances—for example, between quantities of new equipment and the spare parts for it. As a result, the actual combat potential of American armed forces (with a view to the factor of combat readiness) appears to have been augmented to a much lesser degree than indicated by the dynamics of "investment" items in the defense budget.

The shortcomings of Reagan administration policy are particularly noticeable today, now that the Pentagon is experiencing financial difficulties. Even if Congress should agree to lift the freeze on defense budget growth in FY 1989, the rate of increase in the next 5 years will be no higher than 2 percent a year, in accordance with a decision reached by the administration and Congress last November. This situation will present serious problems for new Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci—problems he already encountered when he drew up his budget requests for FY 1989. The requests in his draft budget amount to 299.5 billion dollars, which is not only far below the level envisaged in the administration's long-range plan but is also 10 percent below the figure the Pentagon demanded almost a year ago.

The FY 1989 budget is indicative because it is now that the impact of Congress' cuts in military appropriations in the last 3 years should be completely apparent. Whereas the funds accumulated in Pentagon accounts as a result of the rapid growth of allocations in FY 1980-1985 could compensate to some extent for the effects of budget cuts on specific military plans, today these possibilities have essentially been exhausted. As a result, budget problems will begin to have a direct effect on the Pentagon's long-range plans and on the state of affairs in the armed forces.

The budget framework for FY 1989 will cancel 18 arms modernization programs and postpone another 17 indefinitely. According to some estimates, the U.S. Army will have to reduce its regular forces to 772,600 men in the next fiscal year—i.e., to the lowest level of the last 10 years.

Within these budgetary limits, the Navy will not be able to reach the 600-ship indicator projected for this year and will not receive its new A-6 fighter planes, which will reduce the number of naval air wings from 14 to 13.

For the Air Force the new budget realities signify the impossibility of carrying out the program to increase the number of regular air wings to 28 by the end of the 1980's. According to the estimates of former Assistant Secretary of Defense L. Korb, the Air Force will be unable to maintain even its present level, and the Reagan administration will finish its term in office with a lower number of tactical aircraft than at the beginning of the 1980's.

Budget problems will also affect the program for the modernization of U.S. strategic forces. The draft FY 1989 budget, for example, effectively cancels the program for the new Midgetman ICBM and the commencement of work on the mobile-railway deployment of MX missiles in 1991.

The budget for the new fiscal year does not contain any appropriations for the further development of the ASAT program either. As for the SDI, the projected figure (4.6 billion dollars) is far below last year's request (5.3 billion).

In summation, we can say that the U.S. Defense Department has entered a period of financial difficulty for which the administration is largely to blame. In the opinion of experts, the growth of the defense budget in the first half of the 1980's was used less for a real buildup of American military strength than for the maintenance of the politico-psychological semblance of this buildup. Although U.S. military potential certainly continued to grow in the 1980's, the growth was not as substantial as Pentagon budgets of this period suggested. Without realizing most of its declared ambitions, the administration has put the Defense Department on the verge of crisis with its faulty policy of military financing, absence

of definite priorities, and weaker control over the activities of military agencies. The projected solution envisages the reduction of American Army personnel and slower modernization aimed at creating smaller but more balanced and combat-ready forces.

#### Footnotes

1. In constant FY 1986 prices.
2. The Reagan administration reduced the plan for the deployment of MX missiles by half (from 200 to 100 units) and purchases of air-based cruise missiles (from 3,780 to 1,715).
3. In 1981 the indicator was 26 percent.
4. See Yu.A. Koshkin, "Conflicts in the Pentagon," *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA*, 1988, No 11—Ed.

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**Readers Polled on Soviet-American Relations**  
*18030006d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 21 Nov 88) pp 52-53*

[Article: "Readers' Reactions to Soviet-American Poll"]

[Text] The results of the first joint Soviet-American public opinion poll were published in the March issue of the journal this year. It was organized by APN and the Gallup Institute at the request of *NEWSWEEK* magazine not long before the summit meeting in Washington in December 1987. Respondents answered several questions about bilateral relations and the responses were presented in the form of a table in separate percentages for Soviet and American respondents. The editors asked readers to send in their own replies to the questions.

We are grateful to those who responded to our request and expressed their opinions. We received letters from people in the most diverse occupations—workers, engineers, educators, and university and school students. Readers between the ages of 25 and 35 turned out to be the most active group. Some did not confine themselves to brief responses to the questions and supplemented them with explanatory comments. The letter from S.O. Pavlovskiy (Kaliningrad), who sent the most detailed responses, deserves special mention. Others expressed wishes regarding future issues of the journal and mentioned their favorite articles in past issues. The editors appreciate comments of this kind because they help us choose topics with the greatest appeal and let us know which aspects of Soviet-American relations have not been discussed sufficiently. For example, Sh. Abdullin (Naberezhnyye Chelny) remarked: "We do not like it when the American press dwells on problems in the Soviet Union, but we are doing almost the same thing:

We write so much about unemployment and show pictures of the homeless and of demonstrations, and it seems to me that this could create a slightly distorted view of the United States."

This reader's remarks are completely in line with the conclusions T.Yu. Znamenskaya and A.V. Smagin drew in their article "Foreign Policy Propaganda: War of Words or Concerned Dialogue?" in issue No 9 this year. These authors plan to continue researching this topic, concentrating on the image of the Soviet Union the American mass media have created.

Some readers quite logically said that they had difficulty answering the question about the validity of information about the USSR in the American press and radio and television broadcasts because they are unfamiliar with it. We think that the articles in the new "Scientific Debates" section will help to fill this gap because foreign experts will be given a chance to express their opinions here. The first article in this section in issue No 8 is "Some Observations on the New Thinking" by J. Azrael and S. Sestanovich.

We will summarize the replies you gave in your letters and compare them with the comments of the Soviet respondents published in issue No 3 (we will cite a few in parentheses). The majority are not satisfied with the state of relations between the USSR and the United States, although 86 percent of those who wrote in (in comparison with 40 percent in the poll published in the March issue) believe that our relations have improved in the last 5 years. In the opinion of the majority of readers, the Americans are pleased with the political and economic system in their country, whereas only 40 percent agreed with this statement in the last poll. The authors of all the letters had mostly positive feelings about the people of the United States, but the policies of this state aroused feelings of apprehension in 93 percent of those who wrote to the editors (80 percent of the Soviet citizens polled earlier). Virtually the same number believed that our countries are approximately equal in the military sense and that our two countries should have equal military capabilities (71 percent). Of course, information about Soviet-American relations is of interest to almost all. Only 14 percent of our readers, however, believe that the information about the United States in the Soviet press is completely true, but in October-November 1987 an affirmative response was given by 71 percent of the respondents in the USSR. We feel that this change is the result of glasnost in the mass media. People are learning to take a discerning and balanced approach to any news. They want to know the truth, and the journal feels obligated to help them as much as possible.

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## U.S. Compliance with Universal Human Rights Declaration Criticized

18030006e Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 12, Dec 88 (signed to press 21 Nov 88) pp 68-73

[Article by I.A. Geyevskiy: "Washington and the Socio-economic Rights of the Individual"]

[Text] The Soviet people can rightfully take pride in the fact that the social protection of the individual was first proclaimed as a goal in our country—as one of the main goals of the socialist revolution. Measures securing such fundamental rights as the right to work, to rest and recreation, to free medical care and education, to pension security, and others were recorded in the constitution and were implemented. A diversified network of institutions protecting and caring for the individual took shape in our country.

It is true that many difficult problems accumulated in this sphere during the years of stagnation. Their resolution will require serious effort on the part of the entire society and the reordering of priorities. The main socio-economic objective in the next few years will be the quicker resolution of urgent problems connected with public well-being. As speakers noted at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the party is adhering firmly to the line guaranteeing the Soviet people social protection.

We neither overestimate nor underestimate our achievements, we acknowledge difficulties and shortcomings, and we are no longer trying to portray our country as an ideal model for the entire world. Washington, however, is trying to impose the American way of life on others as a model of perfection, and without ever admitting that the fundamental principles recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (in December it will be 40 years since this international legal document of major importance was adopted) are still far from realized in the United States.

Even the American press admits this, and mainly in connection with the following key issues.

Article 23.1 of the declaration says that each person has the right to work, but the number of unemployed people in the United States has fallen below the 2-million mark only twice in the entire postwar period, in 1952 and in 1953. In 1982 the number was 11.8 million.<sup>1</sup> It began declining in the last few years, but it nevertheless amounted to 6.8 million in March 1988.<sup>2</sup>

American labor unions criticize the official data cited above, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, because they believe that these statistics do not tell the whole story of the actual scales of unemployment.

After all, these data apply only to the able-bodied Americans who were not working during the week the survey was conducted and who were actively seeking work in

the 4 preceding weeks. This method of calculation, in the first place, does not count the workers who have already lost hope of ever finding a job and are therefore no longer registered with employment agencies. They are known as "the disillusioned." In March 1988 there were more than a million of these, or 117,000 more than in the fourth quarter of 1987. In the second place, these statistics do not apply to people who have to work part-time. In most cases they did not choose this form of employment but were simply unable to find full-time jobs. In March 1988 there were 5.3 million of these partially employed (or partially unemployed) people in the United States. Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics puts them in the employed category, this is actually what AFL-CIO economist Mark Roberts described as "unemployment in disguise." In all, according to AFL-CIO estimates, the number of completely and partially unemployed people in March 1988 totaled 13.2 million.<sup>3</sup>

And this is not all. The number of unemployed is actually much higher. After all, the figures cited only indicate the number at a specific time, but some Americans are out of work for a few weeks or months, others cannot find jobs for years, and still others are able to find employment only briefly before they are out of work again. According to the data of the AFL-CIO research center for 1981-1987, 60 million people were unemployed at least once. Each year an average of 23.5 million suffered from unemployment, and they lost an average of 4,600 dollars in wages each year.<sup>4</sup>

Under the conditions of mass unemployment, the labor unions' demand that workers be warned 60 days in advance of the closure of enterprises or of the dismissal of more than 50 workers acquired special importance. A bill to this effect was introduced by Senators E. Kennedy and H. Metzenbaum. It envisaged the allocation of a billion dollars to assist workers who lose their jobs as a result of the closure of enterprises, the organization of training and retraining programs, the offer of job placement services, etc. The bill applied only to enterprises with 100 or more blue- and white-collar workers.<sup>5</sup> It would have covered less than half (49 percent) of the employed people in the country. The bill contained a number of provisions relieving employers of the need to inform work crews of dismissals in several cases (in the event of "unforeseen circumstances," etc.). Finally, it applied to only 2 percent of all enterprises.<sup>6</sup>

In spite of its shortcomings, the bill would have eased the lot of the victims of mass dismissals to some extent, but the Reagan administration and the conservatives in Congress took up arms against it. They were expressing the hostile views of the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.<sup>7</sup> The President vetoed the bill, and it was only after stubborn battles in Congress that the bill finally became law.

The existence of such a huge and permanent army of unemployed people in the country naturally keeps millions of Americans from exercising the free choice of



employment envisaged in Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, the United States has no comprehensive system of unemployment compensation, and in the beginning of 1988 it was being received by only 38.1 percent of the jobless Americans.<sup>8</sup> This is a flagrant violation of Article 25.1 of the declaration, which says that "each person has the right...to security in the event of unemployment."

The declaration also proclaims the equality of women. Article 3 says that any person should possess all of the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the declaration, without any distinctions whatsoever, including gender distinctions; Article 23.2 says that "any person has the right to equal pay for equal work, without any kind of discrimination." The Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights clarifies the above-cited statements in the declaration. Article 7, for example, says that each person has the right to a fair wage and equal compensation for work of equal value, without any distinctions whatsoever; women, in particular, should be guaranteed working conditions no worse than the conditions of men, with equal pay for equal work. How is this principle being implemented in the United States?

To date, the ratification of the constitutional amendment proclaiming the equality of women has been impossible. The main social gains of American women are Section VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1973, prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of gender. These normative acts could have played an important role in limiting the discriminatory treatment of working women if the laws had not been violated by the authorities and by employers and virtually ignored by the agency responsible for their enforcement—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

As a result, women earn less than two-thirds as much as men on the average, even when they do the same work; although the gap has been reduced slightly in the last 10 years, there are still sizable differences.

For example, among workers with a higher education (at least 4 years of college) over the age of 25 and working in a full-time job year-round, the women earn only 64 percent as much as the men.<sup>9</sup> Women who have graduated from college earn less than men with a high school education. Women with a high school education who work in full-time jobs year-round earn less than men who have not even finished 8 years of school. Women represent 61 percent of all people over the age of 15 with an income below the poverty level, and so forth.<sup>10</sup>

Of course, it would be an oversimplification to blame all of the differences in men's and women's wages only on discrimination. There are many reasons for the lower wages of women. Nevertheless, according to many American experts, approximately half of the difference in wages is directly related to discrimination against working women.

Article 25.2 of the declaration says that "mothers and infants have the right to special protection and assistance. All children, legitimate or illegitimate, are entitled to equal social protection." In this respect, the United States ranks low on the list among the developed capitalist countries, not to mention the socialist states. There is no law in the United States giving women the right to a maternity leave. A pre-natal and post-natal leave with pay for a maximum of 8-10 weeks is given to women only in five states (California, New Jersey, Rhode Island, New York, and Hawaii), and even here the woman's job is not held open until she returns. It was not until 1987 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state governments could require private firms to offer women short maternity leaves without pay and the guarantee that they would return to the same jobs. As a result, according to official statistics, 48 percent of all mothers with children under 12 months of age now work; 67 percent of all mothers with children under the age of three work full-time. Less than half of the firms in the United States give women maternity leaves (even without pay), and they do not guarantee that the women will keep their jobs.

The United States and South Africa are the only developed capitalist countries without any nationwide standards governing maternity leaves. Laws in other countries, however, envisage a 52-week leave in Sweden (with 90 percent of the wage for 38 weeks), 44 weeks in Italy (80 percent of the wage for 22 weeks), 40 weeks in the FRG (100 percent for 18 weeks), 18 weeks in Chile (100 percent for 18 weeks), and 17 weeks in Canada (100 percent for 15 weeks).<sup>11</sup>

As for the United States, it has only one federal law prohibiting discrimination against pregnant women (1978). It equates pregnancy with common temporary disability, and women are given a maternity leave only if their enterprise has a health insurance plan. Around 40 percent of all women work at these enterprises. For this reason, many leaves are taken without pay. Only half of the 1,500 largest companies guarantee the mother her old job after she stops receiving temporary disability benefits.<sup>12</sup>

Child care is an extremely serious problem. Although half of all mothers with children under a year of age work, as we mentioned above, only around 3,000 of the 6 million employers provide some kind of child care for their female employees. Private child care establishments charge 3,000 dollars a year for each child.<sup>13</sup>

"Each year," the NEW YORK TIMES reported, "a quarter of a million children with a dangerously low birth weight are born in the nation. One out of ten runs the risk of not living to his first birthday."<sup>14</sup> Analyzing the reasons for the particularly high rate of infant mortality in the American capital, the Children's Defense

Fund mentioned "the difficulties connected with pre-natal medical care, including the long lines in municipal clinics, and the lack of health insurance and funds to pay for medical assistance and child care."<sup>15</sup>

Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: "Each person has the right to the standard of living needed for the preservation of his own and his family's health and welfare." Mass poverty, however, is one of the most tenacious phenomena in the American society. Describing the dynamics of poverty in the United States, *FORTUNE* magazine remarked: "Around half of the population of the United States was poor during the Great Depression if we recalculate the poverty level in 1930's dollars. The number of poor had decreased to 30 percent of the population by 1950 and to 20 percent by 1964. After the War on Poverty Program went into effect, the indicator declined to 12 percent in 1969.... Although the percentage of poor people decreased in the 1970's, the progress in this area was slower than in earlier decades, despite the quicker growth of government expenditures on aid to the poor. The problem was that the state of the economy was deteriorating and demographic trends were undermining family income.... There were more families headed by single mothers."<sup>16</sup> In 1979 the number of poor decreased to 9 percent, but it rose to 14 percent in 1985 (33.1 million people), and the figure was 13.6 in 1986 (32.4 million).<sup>17</sup>

Statistical information about the dynamics of the number of Americans living below the "poverty level" cannot illustrate all aspects of the problem. In particular, it cannot reveal how tragic the situation of various groups of poor Americans can be. As Director R. Greenstein of the Center for Budget and Political Priorities said, "the poor are getting poorer." In 1986, for example, poor families had an income below the poverty level by 4,394 dollars on the average: The gap had never been this wide in the last 25 years, with the exception of the crisis years of 1982 and 1983. The number of the "poorest of the poor" is rising. In 1986, 12.7 million people had an income of half or less than half the poverty level figure—the biggest gap in the last decade.<sup>18</sup>

Conservative groups campaigned against government aid to the poor for many years. They deliberately distorted the image of the welfare recipient. Numerous studies by scientific centers and public organizations provided conclusive evidence of the groundlessness of the propagandistic lies designed to turn public opinion against the "loafers" who wanted to live off the taxpayers. Even rightwing press organs rejected these stereotypes in some cases. According to the weekly *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*: "The poor are usually described as lazy. They are portrayed as urban blacks incapable of holding a job or inner-city welfare mothers whose sole work experience consists in giving birth to and raising illegitimate children. In fact...these popular assumptions are terribly exaggerated. Around 60 percent of the poor are healthy adults who do seasonal or

part-time work."<sup>19</sup> They have to agree to take any kind of job, even if it provides them with an income below the poverty level. The majority are white families, with both parents, and they are distributed evenly among cities, suburbs, and rural communities. In contrast to the poor who live on welfare (the number of these has risen only slightly in the last decade), the number of "working poor" is rising rapidly. There were 6.5 million of them in 1979 and 8.9 million in 1986. The number of these who work full-time and year-round rose from 1.36 million in 1976 to 2 million in 1986. In this context, renowned political correspondent Tom Wicker wrote: "In spite of all the meaningless talk about 'lazy failures' and 'the helpless poor,' 41.5 percent of all poor people over the age of 14 had jobs in 1986."<sup>20</sup>

*U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT* chose the story of Rose Hammel from Johnstown, Pennsylvania, as a typical example. She was earning around 16,000 dollars a year at a steel combine, the same amount as her husband, but she lost her job in 1979. Her husband left her, and Rose, who had just given birth to her second child, could not find a job for 5 years. She took training courses and pawned everything she could pawn, even a silver dollar her father had given her.... Now she works in a kennel, but she earned only 5,850 dollars last year—hardly enough to support her two children, her stepson, and her new husband, who recently lost his job (after working at a car wash for 19 years). She takes care of the dogs, cleans up after them, and comes into the kennel for an hour and a half even on her days off, without getting any kind of extra compensation for this. Theoretically, she has 2 days of sick leave a year, but the boss forced her to take these days at the same time as the Christmas holidays. "This is what we have to go through to earn just a little bit of money," she said sadly. "I feel like a slave." The magazine concluded: "It is not surprising that financial ruin often causes family arguments, alcohol abuse, and depression. Some times even a middle-class family can lose everything and be left homeless. This is happening more and more frequently to the lowest-paid workers who cannot afford even the cheapest housing."<sup>21</sup>

Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims the right to medical care, is no more than a fond wish for much of the U.S. population. Americans who are not covered by government medical assistance programs and do not have health insurance are in a particularly difficult position. As Senator E. Kennedy said, "37 million of our fellow citizens do not have even the most basic form of health insurance."<sup>22</sup>

Article 25.1 also records the right of each person to housing. This right is being violated everywhere. The American press frequently contains articles about the plight of the homeless.

The authorities are trying to conceal the scales of the problem by asserting that there are no more than 250,000-350,000 homeless people in the country. In the opinion of several public organizations, this is only a

fraction of the real number. The National Coalition for the Defense of the Homeless believes that "from 2 to 3 million Americans have no home—more than at any time since the Great Depression." Furthermore, the number of families seeking some kind of shelter increased by 32 percent just in 1987.<sup>23</sup> The children of homeless Americans are in a disastrous position.

The eternal problem of the homeless was exacerbated dramatically by the economic crisis of the early 1930's. The severe social upheavals of those years forced the government to take action. It began allocating fairly large sums for the construction of housing for low- and middle-income families and underwriting loans for those who wanted to buy their own homes.

According to UE NEWS, a progressive union newspaper, "the United States was a nation of renters just half a century ago or less. In 1940 the majority of American families lived in rented dwellings. After World War II the housing construction boom which was promoted by the federal government changed the situation within the lifetime of a single generation. Between 1945 and 1965, 30 million single-family homes were built. Government-financed housing construction allowed thousands of workers to move from slums to modern apartments during the same period." However, the newspaper goes on to say, these days are gone. "House prices are rising more quickly than income in most parts of the country. On the national level these prices rose 108 percent between 1976 and 1986, while the average family income rose only 9 percent." The housing problems of indigent and low-income families are compounded by the practices of landlords, who, in their thirst for income, prefer to get rid of poor tenants and remodel their buildings for wealthier renters. As a result, in 1985 there were only 4.2 million affordable apartments for the 8 million low-income renters.

"The Reagan administration," UE NEWS goes on to say, "bears a grave responsibility for the housing crisis, which was created by its severe budget cuts and its cynical philosophy of letting the market settle everything. Between 1980 and 1987 it stopped increasing funds for the program of aid to low-income renters and federally financed housing construction and did away with most of the assistance grants for housing construction in rural areas and for senior citizens. In the last 7 years the Reagan-Bush administration cut public housing funds by 78 percent while doubling military expenditures."<sup>24</sup>

The facts cited above (they are certainly not isolated cases, and they are reported in bourgeois publications as well as in the progressive labor press) clearly testify that the socioeconomic rights of citizens are being violated constantly in the United States. Obviously, the serious social gains of the American laboring public cannot be ignored. The most important of these are directly related to the mass demonstrations of the 1930's and 1960's. In the bourgeois society, however, these gains can only be tenuous. In the 1970's and 1980's conservative forces

launched a massive attack on the socioeconomic rights and interests of the laboring public. Although they were unable to carry out their plans for social revenge and to turn the clock back half a century, millions of workers suffered substantial financial losses as a result of their policies.

#### Footnotes

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6. Ibid., 23 April 1988, p 4.
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8. Ibid., 9 April 1988, p 1.
9. "Facts on U.S. Working Women. U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau," July 1985, pp 1, 2.
10. Ibid., January 1986, p 2.
11. NEWSWEEK, 26 January 1987, p 35.
12. AFL-CIO NEWS, 19 March 1988, p 11.
13. Ibid., 5 March 1988, p 7.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 June 1987.
15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 February 1987.
16. FORTUNE, 26 May 1986, p 68.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 November 1987; THE WASHINGTON POST, 31 July 1987; FORTUNE, 26 May 1986.
18. AFL-CIO NEWS, 9 January 1988, p 7.
19. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11 January 1988, p 19.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 November 1987.
21. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11 January 1988, p 22.
22. AFL-CIO NEWS, 24 January 1987, p 7.
23. THE WASHINGTON POST, 5, 17 December 1987.
24. UE NEWS, 24 June 1988, pp 6-7.

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